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The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has placed great 
importance on working by, with and through partners during the Global War on 
Terrorism.  Grand strategies such as Line of Operation #2: Expand the Global SOF 
Network and the millions of dollars allocated to security force assistance are evidence of 
this emphasis.  We develop and present a model to measure the value of the Global 
Special Forces Operation Network to counterterrorism operations. 
This model translates the strategy into clear objectives at the operational and 
tactical level.  The model is based on a performance measurement tool for strategy 
implementation widely accepted in the private sector called the Balanced Scorecard.  We 
introduce the natural unit of policy options created as a measure.  This non-financial 
measure is a modification the traditional balanced scorecard and supports use by 
USSOCOM elements in the Global War on Terrorism.  We argue that implementation of 
the model presented in this paper could enhance operational assessment and resource 
allocation decision-making by enabling assessment of the health of U.S. policy options in 
a region and identifying USSOCOM activities that can positively influence the quality 
and the quantity of those options. 
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The fact of the matter is, that [counterterrorism] piece—that we do better 
than anybody in the world—… is a small part of our portfolio, the broader 
part of our portfolio is how we build capability, how we link with our 
allies and our partners overseas so that we can help them take care of their 
problems so we don't have to end up doing [counterterrorism]. 
Admiral (ADM) McRaven: speech on the Global Special Operations Network 
A. LESSONS IN PARTNERSHIP 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) operate in complex environments that demand a 
wide spectrum of responses to address global threats to U.S. interests.  Admiral 
McRaven’s objective to create and expand the Global Special Operations Network (GSN) 
is traced back to U.S. strategy to build partner capacity and to create options to deal with 
unpredictable future situations.  The U.S. learned from years of experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan that civil unrest leads to very complicated situations.  Each difficult situation 
requires individual assessment of various options that will resolve it successfully.  
Events, such as the following, suggest that global unrest will continue and this 
necessitates expanding the GSN. 
In 2011 in sovereign Iraq, the Iranian-supported Southern Shia militias 
continually attacked U.S. forces with improvised explosive devices and small arms.  In 
the North, Al Qaeda-affiliated Sunnis attempted to do the same.  Several factors 
contributed to an extremely complicated security situation.  Dealing with the situation 
required partnership. 
The population included Shia, Sunni, Christian, semi-autonomous Kurds, Syrians, 
tribes, and more.  Several security forces reflected similar religious-ethnic diversity, 
unique loyalties, and territories: Sunni Police units, Shia Iraqi Army units, Shia Iraqi 
Army Special Forces units, and Kurdish Iraqi Army units and militias.  These units drove 
to achieve their own individual objectives, but did not collectively align with U.S. 
objectives. 
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Coupled with the complexity of religious-ethnic diversity, the Iraqi government 
imposed a moratorium on unilateral operations (U.S. only). Adding to the complexity, 
SOF Iraqi army partner forces were Shia and would not attack other Shia’s in the south.  
This put the U.S. in a dilemma.  Additionally, U.S. government further complicated the 
range of operations by restricting force composition and size. 
The U.S. worked towards its strategic goals by building individual and coalition 
partnerships.  SOF and Iraqi forces faced Sunni and Shia extremist group networks across 
Iraq.  Their mission was to ensure security during the drawdown and limit the extremist 
damage to withdrawing U.S. troops through counterterrorism operations.  Special 
operations units assigned to Operation New Dawn supported the Iraqis through Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID) training and by outfitting Iraqi forces with sufficient equipment to 
conduct operations and information sharing.  These special operations units desired to 
fulfill their mission.  For this they required a partner force capable of taking action with 
them or on their behalf against enemy networks when faced with security crises or 
presented with intelligence-based opportunities. 
These 2011 events in Iraq highlight the dynamic environment and need to develop 
the GSN.  The U.S. experience in Iraq suggests that special operations units need partners 
to increase options to fulfill their mission.  Because of indigenous forces, conflicting 
loyalties, and jurisdiction, SOF operators maintained multiple partner forces.  Depending 
on where the target was located in the area of operations, U.S. special operations 
(USSOF) units matched the target with a partner force willing and able to attack that 
target.  Choices were based on geographic location, religious-ethnicity, political 
differences, and the level of cooperation with the U.S.  By investing training, time, and 
resources, USSOF units developed relationships with several local security forces.  When 
a security crisis arose, such as the Al Qaeda (AQ) summer assault on the government 
building in Kirkuk, USSOF units met the crisis with a partner that was willing and 
capable of responding.  Similarly, when intelligence presented the opportunity to capture 
a senior AQ leader as he transited from Syria on his way to Baghdad, forces in Mosul 
acted rapidly.  USSOF accomplished this by being prepared with a partner force able to  
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penetrate the fiercely territorial and extremely dense urban neighborhoods of Iraq’s 
second largest city.  These events demonstrate the value of a GSN that creates activities 
leading to options. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) commander, 
Admiral McRaven, proposed after winning the current fight in Afghanistan, “Expanding 
the Global Special Operations Network” is the next highest priority.  Admiral McRaven 
repeatedly stated “we can’t surge trust,” which means the U.S. must be vigilant in 
developing relationship with its partners.  Admiral McRaven’s priorities align with the 
Secretary of Defense’s January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, calling for an agile, 
flexible, and ready Joint Force capable of capitalizing on networks and inter-dependency 
to maximize effectiveness in deterrence and evolving war (Department of Defense 
[DoD], 2012a). 
USSOCOM led to the United States’ effort to combat terrorism on a global scale 
officially since the Unified Command Plan directed USSOCOM to do so in 2004.  
Unofficially, USSOCOM dealt at the front line of innovation with irregular security 
threats since its inception in 1987.  USSOCOM organizes its forces into small units (two-
man teams and larger); then uniquely positions them to tap into deep cultural experiences 
without overwhelming the units’ authority, resources, or causing local, political or 
diplomatic backlashes. 
USSOCOM deals with modern security threats without creating a large footprint 
through the innovative GSN mechanism.  Admiral McRaven described a force that 
addresses the current threat of irregular warfare with limited resources and a decade’s 
stress of sustained combat operations.  The Secretary of Defense echoed McRaven’s 
observations when he issued the following statement:  
The United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan—that 
is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire—anytime 
soon.  But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a 
variety of locales.  Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect 
approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner 
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governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from 
turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military 
intervention.  In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States’ 
allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their 
capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the 
United States does itself. 
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, January 2009 (Livingston, 2011) 
In 2012 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the Capstone Concept 
For Joint Operations (CCJO).  The proposal is described as a “globally postured Joint 
Force that quickly combines capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, 
echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations” (DoD, 2012a).  Partners 
typically share some type of common security critical to the United States.  USSOCOM 
recommends that geographic combatant commanders validate SFA partner’s 
requirements.  Partnering reduces risk and involvement of U.S. troops. 
Providing Security Forces Assistance (SFA) to U.S. allies is a key mechanism for 
establishing partnerships.  SFA involves allocating resources to partners to counter 
current security threats and to deter future threats.  Under DoD direction, SOCOM is the 
joint proponent for SFA.  This means it leads the development of joint doctrine, training, 
and education relevant to SFA activities conducted within a host country from the service 
level down to individual units (Livingston, 2011).  Between 2006 and 2012, the U.S. 
provided $1.8b in National Defense Authorization Act section 1206 funds to 41 countries 
and 15 multi-lateral programs for the specific purposes of counter-terrorism and stability 
operations (National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA], 2013). 
GSN provides security forces assistance (SFA) to U.S. allies.  This may serve to 
expand and strengthen the network.  Partnering through SFA can create an operational 
infrastructure of partnerships that can be employed in future operations.  A corps element 
of the GSN is the infrastructure of U.S. and foreign SOF partnerships. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This project supports Admiral McRaven’s vision to expand the GSN and its 
ability to increase options to guarantee a higher probability of success.  The limited  
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resources provided by Congress require DoD entities to justify the money allocated for 
DoD commands.  To support these requirements, this project addresses the following 
questions: 
• What metrics are appropriate to measure or gauge the effectiveness of a SOF 
network? 
• How can lower tier USSOCOM units’ activities assess performance? 
• How should the value provided by the GSN be measured? 
This project presents a strategy map and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) tool to link 
and measure leading activities and efforts of the multi-faceted USSOCOM as it seeks to 
operate under the guidance of its commander and to expand the GSN.  The strategy map 
and BSC offer a partial answer to the question: “To what end should we expand the 
GSN?” as proposed by the Joint Special Operations University in its Research Topics 
2014.  For USSOCOM, the BSC and strategy map can be models to assess and direct the 
activities and performance of units conducting the SFA mission.  They can also guide 
activities and efforts during the deployment cycle to support the GCC strategy.  
Additionally, this project provides a baseline measurement from which to initiate future 
research and additional analysis. 
D. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
The scope of this project is limited to the development of a strategy map and BSC 
to define links amongst four perspectives (decision maker, customer, internal, and leaning 
& growth).  Furthermore, the assignment of measurable objectives to each perspective to 
increase options for GSN decision makers is analyzed.  The project includes a review of 
relevant literature to provide the reader with a general understanding of the strategy map 
and the BSC concepts, significant characteristics, and the potential benefits USSOCOM 
could gain through the effective implementation of the BSC.  It is assumed that the reader 
has a basic knowledge of business, management, accounting concepts and terminology, 
and general military terminology. 
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E. SUMMARY 
The implementation of a strategy map and BSC with standardized metrics will 
enhance USSOCOMs ability to fulfill the mandate to expand the Global SOF Network.  
Establishing a model that gauges the capability and capacity of partnered nations will 
allow leaders to focus on specific areas that need to be addressed to build our partners 
and partnerships to meet global threats together.  Furthermore, pioneering the 
development and implementation of a BSC—a widely adopted financial tool in the 
private sector—to assess non-financial value, such as “military options created,” is 
compatible with the creative mindset required of USSOCOM operations. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE GLOBAL SOF NETWORK AND SPECOPS STRATEGY 
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) intends to build a 
global network of special operations forces capable of meeting the requirements set forth 
by a changing national strategy.  To understand the origins of the new strategy, consider 
the dominating news headlines regarding the United States Department of Defense over 
the past five years.  Significant changes are happening as a result of a reduced presence in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Budget Control Act of 2011, and a strategic re-balancing 
towards Asia.  These changes are occurring against a backdrop of numerous security 
threats, ranging from an increasingly assertive China to non-state extremist networks in 
the Horn of Africa, Central Asia, and rogue nation-states in the Middle East.  As a result 
of these dynamics, in 2012 the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs released 
guidance on future American defense priorities.  After a decade of sustained conflict, 
they seek to reshape the force, maintain a force capable of dealing with today’s threats, 
and share the burden of cost and risk with strategic partners (DoD, 2012a). 
With strategy being formulated at such high levels within the U.S. Government, 
how can lower tier units within USSOCOM, who are responsible for implementation, 
develop their activities and assess their performance?  Whenever top-down strategic 
guidance is imposed, there is ultimately an inflection point where members of the 
organization tasked with implementation, take ownership of the strategy when planning 
and executing everyday activities.  The Balanced Scorecard is an effective tool to 
interpret strategies, develop operations, and to assess performance towards obtaining 
strategic objectives.  This project will establish a model with which to evaluate the 
network of special operations strategy.  It will also provide a starting point for examples 
of performance measurement in line with strategy that should be ultimately modified and 
tailored to geographic or culturally-specific networks. 
We begin with a review of existing documentation regarding the Global Special 
Operations Network (GSN) strategy and literature regarding the Balanced Scorecard 
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(BSC).  We then generate a strategy map that examines key perspectives on the GSN and 
how they perceive success.  This strategy map identifies the creation of military and 
informational options, aggregation of the special operations forces (SOF) 11 core 
activities, as the primary purpose of the GSN.  The strategy map examines strategically 
linked activities conducted by SOF and traces their impact on the overall purpose of the 
GSN.  Once this link is established, we suggest performance metrics to assess successful 
activities in the Balanced Scorecard.  We conclude with discussions and observations 
from this process. 
1. Expand the Global SOF Network 
Extremist networks squeezed in one country migrate to others.  Terrorist 
propaganda from a cell in Yemen can incite attacks as far away as Detroit 
or Delhi … Technology and globalization have made our countries and 
our communities interdependent and interconnected. 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, 2012, May 23, Special Operations Gala  
USSOCOM responds to changes in the national strategy by expanding the GSN.  
Recent changes in the national strategy made by decision makers, including the president 
and the Secretary of Defense, influence USSOCOMs formulation of the GSN strategy 
among other factors.  These factors can be traced to a list of requirements described in the 
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 
(CCJO) (DoD, 2012a).  The necessity for changes in U.S. strategy is driven by a decade 
of extended conflict, the Budget Control Act of 2011, and increasingly networked threats 
(DoD, 2012e).  The strategic requirements outlined in these documents stress a smaller, 
more flexible, joint force that is globally postured to capitalize on inter-dependencies of 
partners and networked so that it can quickly combine capabilities in response to crisis 
and opportunities (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013).  
USSOCOM designs its strategy to complement the broader national strategy set forth by 
the DSG and the CCJO. 
Cost effectiveness is an aspect that makes USSOCOM uniquely capable of 
meeting the requirement, as stated by the NSC, for a smaller, leaner, joint force.  
Justification for SOF as the smaller, leaner force is echoed by Linda Robinson, a Senior 
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Fellow for U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign 
Relations.  Robinson identifies that SOF’s impact in the global war on terrorism has been 
significant, while USSOCOMs share of the defense budget remains relatively small at 
four percent (Robinson, 2013).  Despite financial and risk constraints, a distinguishing 
feature of SOF compared to conventional forces is SOFs ability to conduct missions 
successfully within financial constraints (The future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, 
2012).  SOFs lower cost and higher battlefield effect make it ideally suited to meet 
specific requirements set forth by national security decision makers in the updated 
national strategy. 
a. A Network of Partners 
A global posture that can capitalize on partner inter-dependencies will 
require SOF to be a networked and disaggregated force highly educated in its partner’s 
national security objectives and limitations.  ADM McRaven points out that SOF forces 
are currently in over 75 countries with plans to expand (Posture Statement of Admiral 
William H. McRaven, 2013).  This global presence acts as a sensor that continually 
updates the entire U.S. military on enemy threats and, equally as important, the risks 
partners have in shared challenges.  To promote partnership, ADM McRaven suggests 
that the GSN should build trusting, lasting relationships and new ways to solve these 
encounters together (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013).  A key 
point here is that during future security challenges, the U.S. should not have to go it alone 
and, thus, the U.S. should diffuse risk and cost among partners.  Strong relationships do 
not occur overnight.  These relationships must be created over time and be in place before 
the next security challenge hits.  A key tenet of expanding the GSN is the inclusion and 
engagement of foreign partners to capitalize on inter-dependencies. 
ADM McRaven includes building a partner’s capacity as a critical element 
to prevent emerging local security threats from becoming regional threats (Posture 
Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013).  Robinson calls for SOF to 
implement a more organized approach toward these partnerships through coordinated 
engagement (Robinson, 2013).  Defense Secretary Robert Gates observed that while 
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unilateral military accomplishment during the war on terror has been significant, just as 
important is how well the U.S. assists and supports partners to defend and govern their 
own countries (Livingston, 2011).  Robinson identifies partners as ranging from 
“government forces, to informal groups like tribes, or community defense groups or 
populations” (Special Operations Forces, 2012).  SOF is the most capable of Defense 
Department components at implementing the new national strategy, but it will require 
some adjustments in their organizational focus. 
b. Providing Special Operations Capability 
In a statement to Congress, ADM McRaven emphasized that USSOCOM 
always requires approval from the NSC, GCCs, and the chiefs of mission (CoM) (Posture 
Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013).  ADM McRaven further stated that 
the purpose of SOCOM strategy will be to, “provide GCCs and Chiefs of Mission with 
improved special operations capacity, aligning structures, processes and authorities to 
enable a network” (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013).  
USSOCOM’s strategy is well aligned with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
request to “build a stronger network to defeat the networks that confront us” (Posture 
Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013).  As the force re-postures towards a 
new strategy with greater emphasis on partnership, ADM McRaven reiterated that SOF 
works with GCCs and for decision makers at the CoM level and in the NSC.  In the 
commander’s forward to the SOF operating concept, McRaven envisions future 
interdependent and networked forces presenting innovative strategic options to the 
national leadership. 
The previous sections summarize the strategies, antecedent requirements, 
and follow on constraints set forth by the nation’s decision makers and planners.  We 
examined the specific USSOCOM strategy of expanding the Global SOF Network. This 
would meet national requirements of a smaller, more flexible, joint force that is globally 




that it can quickly combine capabilities in response to crisis and opportunities.  The GCC 
and CoM will employ this Global SOF Network as they deal with irregular threats in 
their respective areas of responsibility (AOR). 
B. THE BALANCED SCORECARD 
1. Purpose 
Historically, it has been extremely difficult to translate strategy into measurable 
performance.  Robert Kaplan and David Norton’s 1996 book, The Balanced Scorecard: 
Translating Strategy into Action, presented the BSC as a tool to help assess and report an 
organization’s performance in relation to its strategy.  The book described how 
management can choose multiple financial measures that reflect performance, as well as 
non-financial measures that can be leading indicators for future performance.  Kaplan and 
Norton suggested the BSC is a management tool intended to help organizations succeed 
in achieving their strategy.  Specifically, there are four ways the BSC helps an 
organization achieve its strategy: The BSC helps an organization explain its vision and 
strategy; links strategic objectives and measures; plans, sets targets, and aligns strategic 
initiatives; and enhances strategic feedback and learning (Caudle, 2008).  Success is 
achieved by integrating these four factors and by selecting specific measures of activities 
that have a direct effect on the achievement of the organization’s strategy.  The measures 
and strategy are linked in a cause and effect manner.  This can increase or decrease the 
bottom line based on the measurement drivers.  Below is an example of how a private 
sector, for-profit organization cause and effect relationship may be approached: 
• Increased employee training leads to 
• Decreased employee errors, leading to 
• Increased product quality and efficiency, which leads to 
• Improved customer satisfaction, finally leading to 
• Increased sales and profits. 
The BSC has been studied in a variety of for-profit environments, with a balanced 
set of measures tied to different points of focus within organizations.  The most 
commonly used focal points are: learning and growth capabilities, the efficiency of 
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internal processes, customer value, and financial success.  Kaplan explains a key point: 
There is no reason that an organization must use the four perspectives; each organization 
can and should develop its own dimensions of importance.  The four perspectives can 
serve as a guide to assist in developing a linked set of metrics tied to U.S. military 
strategy (Niven, 2003).  Sometimes important metrics may not easily fit within one (or 
more) of the four perspectives, or a certain perspective may not be relevant to an 
organization’s business environment, including the focus on profits.  When a disparity 
between the traditional BSC model and an organization’s goals arise, customizing the 
BSC is a viable option (Niven, 2008). 
a. Barriers 
In 1999, a story in fortune magazine, Niven argued that 70 percent of 
companies failed from bad execution—not a bad strategy (Niven, 2008).  Niven notes 
that even successful organizations have difficulties implementing strategy (2008).  He 
further discusses four barriers: vision, people, management, and resources that, if not 
addressed, can impede an organization from achieving its strategy (Niven, 2003).  
Breaking down these barriers increases the likelihood of success.  As explained in the 
next section, Niven provides examples of how to overcome each barrier (Niven, 2003). 
Promoting an environment with employee empowerment, dialogue, and 
information sharing allows employees at all levels to become involved with the overall 
vision and direction of the organization. 
b. People 
Creating incentives for working tends to increase motivation and the 
desire to excel.  It is important, however, not to sacrifice the long-term strategic goals for 
a short term gain. 
c. Management 
Developing managers involved with subordinates’ everyday activities and 
promoting an environment that allows two-way dialogue is vital.  This method directly 
ties everyone to the organization’s vision. 
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d. Resource 
The majority of companies do not realize how closely linked their budget 
is to strategy.  The strategy should drive the activities for which the budget is allocated.  
A budget should be focused on the objectives the organization is trying to accomplish 
rather than constraining the organization. 
Identifying the strengths of a company is an important element when 
implementing the BCS because it allows the ability to focus those strengths on 
weaknesses or barriers impeding the strategy.  
2. Application  
The BSC provides a model to link employee action to the leader’s vision and 
strategies (Niven, 2008.).  Organizations first need to develop a strategy map: This 
defines a path to move an organization from its current to its desired position.  The 
strategy map is comprised of objectives.  In the next step, organizations break the 
objectives into measures that quantify progress on the objectives.  These measures 
comprise the BSC.  That is, the Balanced Scorecard contains the performance measures 
that monitor progress, allowing the organization to track towards their objectives (Niven, 
2008). 
The BSC is a system comprised of both the strategy map of objectives and the 
BSC of measures.  The system, however, is not called both the Strategy Map and 
Balanced Scorecard model because the Strategy Map originated from the efforts of the 
early Balanced Scorecard adopters.  These early adopters initially struggled to envision 
the Balanced Scorecard without a clear path of objectives, which facilitated the creation 
of the strategy map (Niven, 2008).  For the remainder of this project, we will use the term 
Balanced Scorecard to refer to both the Balanced Scorecard and the strategy map. 
3. Use in Complex Organizations 
Kaplan conducted a research project with 12 companies to discover new methods 
of performance measurement.  Leaders in these 12 companies believed that their financial 
measures of performance were hindering their ability to create value.  Kaplan and Norton 
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hypothesized that financial performance measures were not as modern as the current 
business enterprise (Niven, 2008.).  Though the original intent of the Balanced Scorecard 
was to balance a firm’s financial data with drivers that focused on the future value of the 
organization, more companies are now using the Balanced Scorecard as a means to align 
short-term actions with their strategy (Niven, 2008).  Since 1996, when Kaplan and 
Norton published the Balanced Scorecard book, over half of all Fortune 1000 companies 
have adopted the Balanced Scorecard (Niven, 2008).  Along with the numerous fortune 
1000 companies that adopted the BSC, so have several government entities.  The 
following three government entities have adopted the BSC. 
4. Balanced Scorecards Used in Government 
a. Department of Homeland Security 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recognized that the BSC 
could convert an organization’s mission and business strategy into a limited number of 
specific objectives that could be linked and measured operationally (Caudle, 2008).  
Research by DHS uncovered that Kaplan and Norton’s recognition that the BSCs for 
public sector organizations were not completely congruent with those of for profit 
companies (Caudle, 2008).  Government and nonprofit organizations are not designed for 
financial gain.  Therefore, in these organizations’ BSCs, the financial perspective did not 
necessarily belong at the top of the hierarchy.  For the public sector, the value creation 
process targeted public sector customers, taxpayers, and fiduciary outcomes.  Kaplan 
recommended placing financial and customer perspectives at the top in a co-equal status, 




Figure 1.  Sample BSC (from Caudle, 2003). 
b. NRO 
A less known government organization, the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO), has also adopted the BSC.  NRO is responsible for acquiring and 
operating the world’s most advanced space-based intelligence capabilities (National 
Reconnaissance Office [NRO], 1999).  Previously a classified operation, NRO was 
responsible for providing this service to the national and military leaders of the United 
States in a classified environment for almost 30 years (NRO, 1999).  NRO implemented 
the BSC to align their goals in four primary areas: customer satisfaction, process 
improvement, financial management, and employee satisfaction (NRO, 1999).  
Embedded in each of the four categories, specific goals were defined that created a “one 
team” approach to support NRO’s attainment of its future desired state (NRO, 1999).  
NRO continues to use the BSC today. 
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c. Army 
Shortly after the BSC was introduced in the early 1990s, the U.S. Army 
began using it to assess whether troops were adequately equipped to deploy (Unknown, 
2013).  The U.S. Army is a large and complex organization that, like the previous 
examples, is not a profit-based organization. It found the BSC to be a good fit (Unknown, 
2013).  The BSC allowed the Army to focus on its non-financial performance to give an 
overall picture of its strengths and weaknesses—rather than its balance sheet.  Based on 
the success of the BSC, the Army created the Strategic Readiness System (SRS). 
d. Strategic Readiness System (SRS) 
On March 13, 2002 the Army Chief of Staff Gen. Erik K. Shinseki 
approved the Army Scorecard. It is now the foundation for the Strategic Readiness 
System (SRS).  The SRS has changed how the Army manages and reports readiness and 
it is a critical component of the Army's overall transformation. 
5. Success of the Balanced Scorecard 
The U.S. Army's success in incorporating the BSC was such that other American 
military organizations, including Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the Department of the Army now use the BSC as a 
focal point for logistical planning (Posture Statement of the United States Army, 2003).  
The Army identified why the BSC has been a successful tool for evaluation. 
• It clarifies strategies and communicates to the organization 
• It identifies key internal processes that will drive strategic success 
• It aligns investments in people, technology, and organizational capital for 
the greatest impact. (Posture Statement of the United States Army, 2003) 
The previous examples illustrate the utility of the BSC approach in government 
organizations.  In particular, these examples emphasize the use of the BSC to measure 
non-financial objectives.  We thus draw on the BSC approach to develop a model for 
assessing the value of the GSN. 
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C. WHAT GETS MEASURED, GETS DONE 
I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and 
express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot 
measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a 
meager and unsatisfactory kind.  If you cannot measure it, you cannot 
improve it. 
Lord Kelvin 1883 (Kaplan, 1993) 
Noting the success of the BSC outside of traditional for profit firms, we decided 
to apply it to the strategy of a SOF network.  Implementing the scorecard to advance 
USSOCOM strategy seems a good fit due to the complexity of both the strategy and the 
organization that will implement it.  The USSOCOM strategy is extremely complex for 
several reasons.  The strategy seeks to achieve gains in intangible areas, with relatively 
less people and those who formulated the strategy are not responsible for implementing 
it.  When dealing with this level of complexity, identifying key activities and, more 
importantly, measuring and recording the effects of those activities will assist members 
of the organization in assessing their performance. 
1. Complicated Things to Measure 
The central objectives of the strategy are difficult to measure.  Measurement 
difficulty challenges those tasked with implementing the strategy.  In summary, the 
forward-looking SOF Operating Concept states that the objectives of the GSN are to: 
understand the human aspects of partners, the enemy and the conflict; build partner 
capacity; and to build trust amongst partners (United States Special Operations Command 
[USSOCOM], 2013).  Unlike typical military objectives, such as seizure of territory, skill 
proficiency, or maintenance readiness, the objectives of the GSN are very difficult to 
measure and assess.  Assessing progress without a known, measurable point of reference 
makes “understanding of a partner” or “trust between them and yo” difficult.  It could be 
compared to swimming in the open ocean without view of land. If there are no visual 
points of reference, the swimmer has a hard time gauging speed or direction. 
Further complicating these strategies, is the requirement that those tasked with 
taking action must make assumptions in order to succeed.  The belief that gaining and 
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maintaining partner support against common enemies can be achieved, and that SOF can 
generate influence on those partners to act is an example of such an assumption.  The 
networked nature of future threats makes them increasingly complex (National 
Intelligence Council [NIC], 2012).  Individual access to information is at its highest in 
human history (NIC, 2012).  This access to information and involvement in networks 
empowers U.S. enemies, making them unpredictable and more difficult to deal with than 
previously.  Understanding these inter-dependency connections and generating influence 
on them will be extremely challenging.  By quantifying the effects of activities towards 
achievement of objectives, the BSC may assist leaders in monitoring the accuracy and 
relevancy of assumptions. 
a. Organizational Complexity 
The USSOCOM strategy seeks to counter the terrorist threat. The U.S. has 
fought this threat over the last decade with fewer people and resources.  The nation’s 
response to terrorism threats since 9-11 has involved large-scale contingency operations 
in multiple theaters.  Troop levels required to respond to these threats has at times 
exceeded 180,000 in Iraq and Afghanistan alone, yet the number of deployed special 
operators in FY2013 was only 12,000 in about 70 countries (Robinson, 2013).  This 
disparity represents a significant change and increases the complexity of the problem 
facing SOF as they implement the SOF network strategy.  It also represents the 
disaggregated nature of the small footprint approach advocated by many of the strategists 
designing the GSN. 
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Figure 2.  Troop Levels for Overseas Contingency Operations 
b. Many Implementers 
The highest levels of the government and military formulated SOCOM’s 
strategy.  USSOCOM’s strategists are in a unique position to assess the big picture.  
Appropriately, USSOCOM set a direction for the organization.  Now, the members of the 
organization must interpret this strategy of “expand the GSN” and then implement it.  
The 12,000 members of the USSOCOM organization implementing this strategy will do 
so within a complex organization with a diverse set of capabilities (Robinson, 2013).  The 
lower tiers of the USSOCOM organization must take ownership of the strategy at some 
point.  Quantifying their activities will allow them to better understand the effects of their 
actions.  The examples discussed previously suggest that the BSC is an appropriate tool 
to encourage ownership of SOCOM’s strategy at every level of the organization. 
USSOCOM intends to meet requirements set forth by the National 
Defense strategy by establishing a network of partners called the Global SOF Network or 
GSN.  This strategy is a new initiative for a complex organization.  The BSC is a proven 
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tool used by Fortune 1000 companies to link strategy with action and to measure 
performance.  Organizations have successfully used the BSC to tie strategy to everyday 
activities.  This tool incorporates the entire organization into one team striving towards 
the objectives congruent with the strategy by measuring performance towards the goal.  
In the recent past, the BSC has had increased popularity with government entities.  We 




A. RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHOD 
We began this project with the general overall question: Can the value or 
effectiveness of a SOF network be measured or quantified? If so, what metrics are 
appropriate to measure or gauge the effectiveness of a SOF network? With these 
questions in mind, we reviewed DoD and USSOCOM strategic guidance and commander 
posture statements to gain an overall understanding of the problem and to develop an 
approach to answer the question.  We adopted a top-down theorizing approach to develop 
a strategy map and Balanced Scorecard. 
Top-down theorizing begins with examining existing knowledge to discern a 
problem between divergent perspectives and then finding a solution to the problem.  
Using Top-down theorizing involves re-examining the norms that created the problem to 
promote divergent thinking (opportunal thinking) and generative strength and, thereby, 
provide the potential to generate new theoretical insights in the form of hypotheses 
(Sheperd, 2011).  These hypotheses can be tested by collecting and analyzing data of 
interest (discussed in a follow on section).  Admiral McRaven created the Operation 
Performance Team (OPT) to collect and analyze how to implement the GSN.  
USSOCOM identifies both problems and solutions in today’s environment using 
historical information to create a top-down approach. 
The BSC literature prescribes the following process for developing a BSC to 
accomplish critical management processes.  This process is broken into four categories: 
Clarifying and translating strategy, Communicating and linking, Planning and target 
setting, and strategic feedback and learning. 
1. Clarifying and Translating the Vision and Strategy 
Clarifying and translating the vision and strategy begins with the senior 
executives translating business strategy into specific strategic objectives.  Their job is to 
determine the focus of the company to ensure objectives drivers (financial, market share,  
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profitability) strive to meet the objectives (Kaplan, 1996).  The interpretation must be 
clear down the chain to every employee.  This translation of the strategy is communicated 
in many different forms. 
2. Communicating and Linking 
Continuous communication is accomplished through interaction, newsletters, 
bulletin boards, and emails to signal reinforcement of objectives (Kaplan, 1996).  
Reiteration through different media reinforces the goals of upper management through 
repetition. 
3. Planning and Target Setting  
Management conducts initial Planning of goals prior to determining the objectives 
to measure.  When developing the goals, traditionally setting goals for a three- to five-
year time frame will allow for proper implementation of the BSC and determine how 
successfully the drivers meet the set objectives (Kaplan, 1996).  Once goals have been 
established and translated to the company receiving feedback to determine if the 
objectives and measures have been properly planned and attainable. 
4. Strategic Feedback and Learning 
Strategic feedback and learning is the most important aspect of the BSC: 
expressing a shared vision, supplying strategic feedback, and facilitating strategy in 
learning (Kaplan, 1996).  Integrating feedback helps management reassess the objective 
and measures to guide the company towards the strategy. 
As a research team, we initially brainstormed and drew conceptual maps.  We 
then brainstormed with larger groups, including peers in the SOF community and faculty 
in the business school.  Discussion with these groups led to refined concepts and a 
specific scope to research.  We recorded ideas on a whiteboard and took detailed notes 
and digital photos of our draft diagrams and concept maps.  As our models developed, we 
vetted our ideas with our peers through informal presentations to other Naval 
Postgraduate School students. 
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Through iterations of brainstorming sessions, we developed a strategy map 
depicting ADM McRaven’s second line of operations—expand the GSN.  We then used 
the strategy map to guide a second round of theorizing as previously described.  We 
brainstormed and drew conceptual maps as a research team; then, with a broader 
audience, we took notes and photos, and then we vetted our ideas with our peers through 
informal presentations.  Through this process, we identified potential activities associated 
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IV. STRATEGY MAP 
Based on guided discovery in the DA 4500 course, Special Topics in Strategic 
Analysis: West Africa & the Global SOF Network, independent research, contemplation, 
and discussion with peers, we created the strategy map discussed in this chapter.  The 
map identifies activities associated with an effective SOF network and, more importantly, 
it suggests that these activities should align to produce a diverse set of options that could 
be used by decision makers during times of opportunity or crisis.  We began our 
observation with an example of a private sector strategy map designed for profit-seeking 
firms complete with shareholders, customers, business processes, and employees.  We 
retained the format that posed a challenge question for each perspective, but altered both 
the rows and the questions to fit a military and, in particular, SOF network purposes.  
This strategy map is a first step in building the Balanced Scorecard that measures and 
quantifies the activities identified. 
Figure 3 depicts our model explaining how USSOCOM can operationalize the 
strategic vision to expand the GSN.  Our model links measurable activities to the creation 
of value.  Measurable activities are performed before deployment to create human and 
enterprise capital as well as activities performed during deployment.  As explained in this 
section, we conceptualize the value provided by the SOF network as the pool of military 
and information options available to high-ranking decision makers.  As shown in our 
model, the answer to the question “How is value returned to stakeholders?” is “Through 
the provision of diverse options to decision-makers.” To provide value, options must be 






Figure 3.  Strategy Map 
A. DECISION-MAKER PERSPECTIVE 
USSOCOM developed the Global Special Operations Forces Network (GSN) in 
part to provide a smaller, more agile, flexible force capable of achieving military, 
diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives in conjunction with U.S. partners 
in sensitive environments (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013).  
We argue that the value provided by the GSN results in large part from the creation of a 
diverse pool of options, or potential solutions, supported by unique resources.  From this 
pool, decision makers can select options to achieve informational and military objectives.  
In the Commander’s Foreword to Special Operations Forces Operating Concept, ADM 




governmental, commercial, and academic partners cooperate, trust each other, and 
combine their capabilities and authorities to provide national leadership with innovative 
strategic options” (USSOCOM, 2013). 
1. Who are the Decision Makers? 
We define decision makers as those responsible for making policy and ordering 
the application of national power to secure the national interest.  Decision makers include 
members of the President’s National Security Council (NSC) such as the Secretary of 
Defense, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence.  Decisions to employ elements of 
national power are also made by the chiefs of mission in foreign countries.  We include 
members of Congress as decision makers because they influence how the nation applies 
power through the control of resources and the power of the purse. 
When decision makers seek to accomplish policy objectives, preferences for 
choices are at the heart of the options’ concept.  The geopolitical environment rarely 
presents crisis or opportunities for which a nation has one specific and tailored solution 
(Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013).  The result is that decision 
makers must evaluate the trade-offs among existing options.  Diverse choices enhance the 
likelihood of finding the optimal policy-strategy match when implementing national 
power.  Additionally, fewer options make actions more predictable and ultimately easier 
for enemies to counter. 
2. What are Options?  
We define options as potential solutions to problems that if exercised or triggered, 
will result in a more favorable outcome than if no action were taken.  Options can be 
categorized by type, each supported and made possible by specific types of resources.  
Our research draws on a spectrum of partnerships familiar to SOF (The Future of U.S. 
Special Operations Forces, 2012).  We also use the DIME typology (JP 3-0) to 
characterize the types of options potentially available to decision makers (DoD, 2011). 
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a. The Partnership Spectrum 
Our strategy map depicts that partnership can be characterized along a 
spectrum.  The lowest level of partnership is unilateral action. This means that the U.S. is 
the only nation taking part in the action and, thus, no partners are involved.  The highest 
level of partnership is non-attributable, where proxies act in U.S. interests, essentially an 
operation involving only the partner.  In the middle is a range of operations conducted 
with varying levels of partnership.  These levels can be specific numbers of troops 
allowed in the operation or percentages, as in 15 percent of the forces participating in an 
operation were American.  They can also represent the amount of effort or responsibility 
that accrues to the partner. 
b. DIME Instruments 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, defines strategy as “a 
prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a 
synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational 
objectives” (DoD, 2011).  Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, characterizes instruments 
of national power as “diplomatic, informational, military, and economic” (DoD, 2011).  
This characterization is referred to as DIME (DoD, 2011).  The DIME typology 
represents the different instruments through which the U.S. exerts power and influence 
and takes action. 
Each type of instrument and partnership has unique attributes and requires 
specific types of resources.  We use on the partnership spectrum and DIME typology to 
characterize the different types of options and the resources they encompass and from 




Figure 4.  Types of Options 
As shown in Figure 4, we consider options along the full partnership 
spectrum, but in only two of the DIME categories.  DoD Directive 5100.01 identifies 11 
SOF core activities:  unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force 
assistance, counterinsurgency, special reconnaissance, direct action, civil affairs 
operations, military information support operations, information operations, 
counterterrorism, and counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (DoD, 2011).  
For simplicity, we aggregate these core activities into either military or information and 
diversify them with partnership.  We do recognize that SOF can utilize both the 
diplomatic and economic instruments of power, but do not address them in this paper.  It 
is also not our intent to preclude innovation of instruments that falls outside of our model.  
Rather, a model necessarily simplifies reality.  Our research assumes that when crisis or 
opportunities occur abroad, the United States will act to promote its interests, and that of 
its allies, by directly exercising available options or mechanisms. 
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c. Military Option 
The military option involves the use of military force to achieve a national 
objective.  For example, the assignment of a military entity to locate, track, and neutralize 
terrorist networks would be a military option.  The resources from which this option is 
derived and that it encompasses are primarily military.  The assault force and supporting 
units required to exercise this option are mostly comprised of military members acting 
within the military organization.  Using mostly military assets and authorities, they locate 
and track terrorists neutralizing the enemy by military force.  Another example of a 
military option would be the application of a no-fly zone enforced by the military.  Such 
a no-fly zone was used during Operation Odyssey Dawn to assist rebels overthrowing 
Libyan dictator Muamar Qadafi.  Although much diplomatic maneuvering to employ the 
no-fly zone occurred, military entities ultimately enforced the policy decision.  Thus, we 
distinguish this action as a military option. 
Military options can be characterized along the spectrum of partnerships.  
Each type of option has unique characteristics that decision makers analyze when 
considering employment of each option.  These are explained in the following examples. 
(1) Military Unilateral (M, U).  An example of the unilateral 
military option is a 90-man assault force comprised entirely of American service 
members.  This force is transported to a target by American helicopters flown by 
Americans.  The entire operation acts on intelligence generated by American assets and 
processed and analyzed by Americans.  Finally, American decision makers approve of 
the mission.  This type of option is nearly always available and has been employed as an 
instrument of national power frequently in the past two administrations. 
From direct action raids to drone strikes, this option has been 
highly responsive to decision makers.  Use of the unilateral military option, however, 
incurs more risk, consumes more diplomatic capital, and extracts a higher price in blood 
and treasure than other options.  When more American lives are in direct threat and there 
is the potential of violating treaties and sovereignty, this creates the potential for costs to 
exceed the benefits of attaining an objective (Howard, 1998).  Financial costs of this 
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particular option may be substantial such that maintaining the capability to have an 
effective and timely unilateral response to every corner of the globe is costly. 
(2) Military Partnered (M, P).  A mixture of both American 
and partner military forces characterize partnered-military options.  Partnered-military 
options are also referred to as the Indirect Approach (Robinson, 2013).  An example 
could be eight American special operators in two American vehicles, together with 40 
partner force soldiers in 10 partner vehicles moving against an enemy objective.  
American intelligence supported the operation, but the partner forces sought approval for 
the operation through their own chain of command.  The partner government, through 
diplomatic channels, requested American involvement on the operation due to capability 
limitations of their armed forces.  Approval for specific American involvement in this 
operation would be granted through the American chain of command to include the CoM. 
This option represents shared risk and cost by capitalizing on a 
situation where the partner and the U.S. have a common threat, and the U.S. has the 
ability to enhance the partner’s capability to deal with it.  The risk of casualties as a result 
of enemy contact is shared with the partner nation through a ratio of 1:5.  Because only 
eight Americans, their vehicles, and their intelligence and support apparatus are involved, 
the cost associated with the operation is minimized. 
The option does represent some trade-offs.  Christopher Lamb, in 
his testimony to Congress, notes, “… when U.S. interests are directly engaged and the 
results really matter, the tendency is to desire more control over the outcome and 
therefore have U.S. SOF complete the mission directly” (The Future of U.S. Special 
Operations Forces, 2012).  In the section regarding the option criteria, we discuss the 
trade-offs in detail. 
(3) Military Non-attributable (M, N).  The non-attributable 
military option can be characterized by American involvement that is not explicit.  For 
example, a 20-man assault force comprised entirely of partner military forces using their 
own boats to conduct a maritime interdiction of a terrorist traveling on a ferry through 
that partner nation’s territorial waters.  Interdiction is aided by an American aircraft 
flying out of visual range, but connected with the partner military force by radio and 
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possibly video.  The American aircraft assists the partner by vectoring the assault force 
towards the terrorist boat and assists the assault force in identifying the wanted terrorist 
from the other personnel on the civilian boat.  The partner nation completely approves the 
mission.  From the people on the boat’s perspective, the entire operation is conducted by 
the partner nation.  The operation would not be successful, however, without the direct 
assistance of the United States. 
The benefits of this operation are reduced signature, reduced risk, 
reduced cost, and reduced chance of civilian casualties blamed on the United States.  At 
no point during the operation are American service members in direct contact with the 
enemy or the population in the partner nation’s country.  The risk of an American 
casualty is zero.  The cost of the operation has been reduced to that of operating the 
aircraft and supplying the partner with communications.  The psychological effect of the 
operation on both the enemy and the population is a net positive for friendly forces.  The 
enemy is confused as to how he was captured and the population views the partner 
security forces as effective. 
The major drawback associated with this type of operation is 
failure of achieving the objective; in this case, capturing the terrorist.  Failure is a 
function of the partner force’s ability to conduct the operation.  If the partner is a third 
world nation, it may not have a sufficient maintenance system for the boats transporting 
the assault force, or gas to make the boats go.  Their chain of command may take too long 
to approve the mission and, therefore, miss the chance to interdict the ferry in their 
waters.  Other tactical shortcomings in this operation could make it a strategic failure. 
d. Information Option 
The information option involves the use of information to achieve a net 
positive result for U.S. interests.  An example is an operation to influence the narrative 
that populations use to understand situations.  Another example is strategic messaging 
that occurs before, during, or after major operations.  It can include any operations that 
use information to set favorable conditions prior to military action.  The resources from 
which these options are derived and that it encompasses can be a combination of military 
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and civilian.  The personnel and intelligence that are used to craft a message or piece of 
information can be either military or civilian.  Likewise, the method of delivery can be 
either military or civilian. 
The importance of the information option is illustrated by General Stanley 
McChrystal’s recounting of the capture of Saddam Hussein (McChrystal, 2013).  As 
recounted by McChrystal, American generals giving a press conference from a captured 
Iraqi palace released the details of Hussein’s capture to the American media.  Iraqis 
perceived the U.S. press reports of these details as evidence of U.S. invaders whooping it 
up after capturing the deposed dictator.  McChrystal posits that a more effective means to 
release that type of information would have been through Iraqis and into Iraqi media.  
This mechanism, however, did not exist at the time. 
Information options can be characterized along the spectrum of 
partnerships.  When considering employment of each option, decision makers analyze the 
various options unique characteristics.  These are explained with the following examples. 
(1) Information Unilateral (I, U).  The unilateral information 
option is illustrated by information generated and delivered by the United States.  An 
example is the propaganda leaflet drop conducted by American military forces prior to 
the invasion of Kuwait in 1991.  The leaflet drop consisted of pieces of paper with a 
message suggesting the Iraqi forces surrender or risk being killed.  The leaflets were 
dropped from U.S. aircraft and contained a message created by U.S. forces. 
The major benefit is that U.S. forces can attrite the enemy without 
incurring the risk of direct combat.  This desirable end-state is achieved by using 
information instead of military force.  A drawback of employing information in this 
manner is that it is easier for the enemy to decipher the origin of the information and, 
therefore, employ counter-measures to defeat it.  Basically, they know we want them to 
surrender and can have a pre-planned response such as assassination of troops that try to 
surrender.  The information would be more effective if the origin was disguised as if it 
came from within. 
(2) Information Partnered (I, P). The partnered information 
option can best be characterized by cooperation with a partner to generate information 
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and deliver it to key stakeholders.  Take for example a security force’s wanted poster in a 
partner nation where several names and faces on the poster are all terrorists the U.S. 
wants to capture.  The names and faces are based on both U.S. and partner intelligence, 
but the poster is in the partner’s language and posted by the partner’s security forces. 
There are several benefits of delivering information to the 
population through a partner.  Benefits include a reduced signature for American forces.  
In this situation, the partner’s sovereignty is protected because they must agree to the 
faces and names on their poster.  Negatives of this method include a potential dilution of 
the message; and the partner can alter what appears on the poster.  As the partner’s 
control increases, the likelihood of a different message increases. 
(3) Information Non-Attributable (I, N). A partner developing 
information in line with U.S. interests and delivering the information in a manner that 
cannot be traced back to U.S. involvement characterizes the non-attributable military 
option.  An example would be a partner delivering a message via local media channels 
that an explosion occurring in a partner country was a suicide bomber, when actually the 
explosion was a U.S. missile strike aimed at taking out a terrorist cell. 
In this example, the information option complements the military 
missile strike by disguising the event as a negative enemy action.  If the U.S. government 
released this message, the local population would likely not believe the report.  By 
releasing the message through the partner nation’s existing media construct, the 
information becomes non-attributable. 
We have discussed several examples of how military and 
information options can affect achieving national objectives.  We have also discussed 
how both the military and information options are affected by partnership, and sometimes 
the certainty of their outcomes is reduced by partnership.  Each unique combination of 
instrument and partnership represents costs and benefits that decision makers must weigh 
when choosing how and when to employ instruments of national power.  Since no two 
situations are the same, it is important for decision makers to have a menu of these 
options to choose between when seeking to achieve national objectives. 
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B. CUSTOMER PERSPECTIVE 
In his 2013 posture statement to Congress, ADM McRaven emphasizes the 
importance of the GSN meeting geographic combatant commands (GCC) and chiefs of 
mission (CoM) requirements to deal with security threats (Posture Statement of Admiral 
William H. McRaven, 2013).  By imagining how the GSN should appear to these primary 
customers, this perspective reveals criteria that options produced by deployed task forces 
must meet prior to being offered to GCCs and CoMs for approval.  These criteria include 
the likelihood of success, responsiveness, connectivity, and the vetting of an option.  
When options meet these criteria, they represent how the SOF organization returns value 
to the primary customer of GCC and CoM. 
In Figure 3, the option criteria are the focus of the customer perspective.  The 
presence, intensity, and combination of these criteria are what make each option unique.  
The deployed task forces found in the internal perspective strive to align their activities to 
support producing options that meet these criteria.  Activities and processes in the 
internal perspective have varying degrees of association with each criterion as 
represented by the thickness of lines connecting criteria with activities. 
 
Figure 5.  The Value Proposition 
1. Who are the Customers? 
We identify the customers as the geographic combatant commander and their 
respective theater special operations commanders.  Geographic combatant commanders 
are typically four-star flag officers of the United States’ military, commanding one of the 
six geographic combatant commands (GCC) that divide the globe into areas of 
responsibility.  GCCs include United States Africa Command, United States Central 
Command, United States European Command, United States Pacific Command, United 
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States Northern Command, and United States Southern Command.  Each GCC has a 
respective theater special operations commander (TSOC), who is subordinate to the 
GCC, and responsible for special operations in the GCC area of operations.  These 
leaders play an important link between civilian decision makers in embassies (CoM) and 
the NSC and the military members of USSOCOM deployed to Joint Special Operations 
Task Forces (JSOTF) around the globe.  As a link, they receive security and diplomatic 
priorities from civilian decision makers.  They develop campaign strategies to respond to 
these priorities.  The functional units they use to implement these campaign strategies are 
Joint Special Operations Task Forces. 
Decision makers look to the GCCs for solutions to security problems.  GCCs look 
to the TSOCs (and USSOCOM) for SOF-specific solutions (Posture Statement of 
Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013).  GCCs/TSOCs are essentially brokers of these 
solutions produced at the JSOTF/TF level and consumed at the decision-maker level.  
Decision makers will evaluate options based on the criteria found in the value 
proposition; GCC and TSOCs will only approve, and pass up the chain of command, 
options that score well on the option criteria level.  Since the GCCs and TSOCs look to 
the JSOTFs for options that score well on the criteria, we suggest the activities of the 
deployed task forces be aimed at maximizing these option criteria. 
2. Option Criteria—The Value Proposition 
When choosing the criterion for the customer perspective, we asked ourselves: 
How should our products appear to our customers?  The answer to this question is: Our 
products should appear as likely to succeed, responsive, vetted, and in consideration of 
the connectedness of our partners.  We found these criteria to be properties of options that 
the customers value over other methods of achieving national objectives.  Essentially, 
these criteria are both what the customers expect from SOF and how they will measure 
the overall quality of each option produced by SOF. 
The value proposition proposed by this strategy map is that of Product Leadership 
(Niven, 2003).  A product-leadership-value-proposition is characterized by an 
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organization striving to offer simply the best product on the market.  By creating options 
that meet the criterion found in the value proposition, SOF attempts to meet this strategy. 
a. Likelihood of Success 
Likelihood of success predicts the probability that an option will attain the 
national interest it intends to attain.  An example of an option meeting the likelihood of 
success criteria is the sheer size of the option as compared to the objective.  For instance, 
a military option consisting of a 90-man assault force would have a high likelihood of 
success against a terrorist camp containing only five armed personnel.  Similarly, 
consider an information option intended to communicate to the population of a city where 
100,000 people live.  The method the option uses to deliver the message only has a reach 
of 20,000.  This information option would be perceived has having a low likelihood of 
success.  The skill or training level of the unit involved in an option can measure 
likelihood of success, but there are many variables that may deem necessary to be 
measured. 
We believe that the customer demands options that have a higher 
likelihood of success.  A high likelihood of success translates to a higher probability the 
national objective sought will be achieved and their decision to employ the option will be 
a success.  The customer can distinguish preference between options if they have an 
understanding and measurement of the likelihood of success. 
b. Option Responsiveness  
The criterion of responsiveness regards the speed of reaction to the 
decision maker’s choice to employ the option.  A simple example that explains 
responsiveness can be found in the steering inputs of a racing car and a ferryboat.  When 
the driver makes the decision to turn the car, he turns the wheel; as he turns the wheel, the 
car immediately turns.  When the ferryboat captain decides to turn the ferryboat, he must 
account for the lag in time between when he turns the wheel and when the ferryboat 
begins to turn.  In this example, the racecar is more responsive than the ferryboat. 
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Responsiveness also includes the time it takes the option to maneuver into 
a position to respond to a crisis or opportunity.  Just as a car race is time sensitive, so too 
are crises and opportunities.  The longer a crisis carries on, the greater the impact.  
Entities attempting to end a crisis wish to do so in a timely manner.  The initiator’s goal 
is to protract the crisis.  The intelligence associated with opportunities is also time 
sensitive.  To exploit the opportunity, the capitalizer must maneuver an option into place 
before intelligence is no longer valid.  Just as a racecar driver requires a highly 
responsive steering input in a car race, customers in our model require highly responsive 
options. 
We ascertain that the responsiveness of an option is important to 
customers (and ultimately decision makers) because of the time sensitivity associated 
with decisions made during times of crisis and opportunities.  A highly responsive option 
allows decision makers to respond to the time-sensitivity associated with crises and 
opportunities.  The customers can distinguish a preference between two or more options 
if they have a full understanding and measurement of their responsiveness. 
c. Option Connectivity 
The connectivity criterion evaluates an option’s relationship with its 
physical access to the socio-political environment.  This criterion strives to enhance the 
understanding of the effects that occur as a result of the decision to employ the option.  
Highly connected options have a strong relationship with their environment; unconnected 
options have no relationship with their environment.  High connectivity is a positive 
attribute for information options and can have either negative or positive attributes for 
military options. 
Consider a scenario where time-sensitive intelligence produces the exact 
geo-location of a wanted terrorist.  Decision makers, wanting to capitalize on this 
opportunity, evaluate the options presented to them by a deployed task force to either kill 
or capture the terrorist.  The deployed task force has two partners they work with in the 
area the terrorist has been geo-located and evaluates these partners by their connectivity. 
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Option Alpha uses U.S. forces partnered with foreign military troops of 
the same tribe and religion as the terrorist.  The task force has assessed this partner to be 
highly connected to the environment that surrounds the target due to tribal and religious 
connections.  Through engagement, they have also assessed this partner to non-concur 
with striking targets of their own religion.  Option Bravo uses U.S. forces partnered with 
foreign military troops of a separate tribe and different religion.  The task force assesses 
this partner to have less connection to the environment that surrounds the target.  They 
have also assessed this partner believes striking this target is in their best interests.  Alpha 
represents a highly connected option.  Bravo represents a less connected option. 
Understanding and quantifying this connectivity helps the task force 
evaluate the trade-offs that occur when choosing to partner with either A, B, or to 
conduct the mission unilaterally.  The task force must weigh the access option A has 
against the option B’s willingness to act.  They must also consider the consequences to 
their relationship with A that partnering with B incurs. 
We think the connectivity of an option is valuable to the customer level 
because it enhances their understanding of the effects that occur as a result of their 
decision to employ an option.  This understanding assists the customer level in predicting 
the socio-political costs and benefits of using an option.  Customers can distinguish 
preference for particular options by evaluating the connectivity each has with its 
respective environment. 
d. Vetted  
Vetted options represent partnership with foreign military units that have 
been approved by U.S. decision makers through adherence to rules defined by the Leahy 
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (Tate, 2011).  The law is designed to prevent 
U.S. assistance to, and involvement with, military units that have been credibly 
implicated in serious human rights abuses.  It is included in the option criteria of the 
customer level to ensure that guidelines established by stakeholders are met. 
U.S. partnership with un-vetted foreign units during either military or 
informational operations creates risk for civilian leadership.  Operational partnership 
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associates the U.S. with the activities of the partner.  Additionally, the U.S. commonly 
provides assistance to partners during these operations.  If a partner has conducted 
continual human rights violations, the U.S. risks that the association and assistance can be 
misinterpreted as the U.S. condoning and sponsoring human rights violations. 
We believe customers will only choose options that have been vetted 
because they value the risk mitigation that the vetting process represents.  By knowing a 
partner involved in an option has been vetted, the customer is somewhat assured of a 
level of conduct associated with employment of the option.  Customers can distinguish 
preference for particular options by evaluating whether or not an option has been vetted. 
e. Quality as an Encompassing Term 
The term quality can represent the aggregate consideration of all four 
criteria.  If SOF are striving to meet a product-leadership type of strategy, as we have 
suggested in the value proposition, then they are attempting to present to customers the 
highest quality product they can produce.  The product that SOF produces, both military 
and informational options, will be evaluated amongst other alternatives such as 
conventional military response and the do nothing choice.  SOF options should appear to 
the customer level as higher quality than the other options available to decision makers. 
f. Control as an Aspect of all Criteria 
Control is the ability to exercise the option at the time of choosing.  
Perfect control constitutes instantaneous action from the point of decision.  Poor control 
causes a delay between the decision to employ the option and the effects of the option on 
the situation.  Delays can arise from any factors that are outside of U.S. control.  For 
instance, delays can be frequent when conducting partnered operations.  The example 
would be the slowness of the partner’s concept of operations approval due to different 
levels of training and coordination. 
An example of perfect control afforded by actionable intelligence would 
be the location of a known terrorist on a kill list with an available drone overhead and a 
missile could launched within minutes of identification and approval.  This option is 
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completely controlled by the U.S.  Control is present because aviation assets used in the 
strike are directed by the U.S. and respond quickly to decisions made to employ the 
mechanism. 
Quality can diminish as control diminishes.  During an “enabled-plus” 
mission, defined as U.S. military advisors accompanying a foreign special operations unit 
on a targeted strike against a terrorist camp, control diminishes with the introduction of 
the partner.  The quality of this option is subject to two factors: skill level of the foreign 
unit (likelihood of success) and control.  U.S. advisors exerting influence vis-à-vis the 
foreign unit’s command structure can overcome control. 
There is a trade-off that exists between high quality, high risk and low 
quality, low risk.  Discussion of option quality also involves a discussion of risk.  The 
trade-off is not science, but more of an art.  Unfortunately, estimates must be made and 
parity is not always clear.  Although military options have been used as the example, 
option quality assessment is not limited to military options. 
When we examined the value proposition presented by SOF, we 
discovered that options should appear as likely to succeed, responsive, vetted, and in 
consideration of the connectedness of our partners.  We have provided examples and 
examined how each criterion creates value in the customer level.  In order to evaluate and 
compare options, it is important for customers to have an understanding of the criteria 
that each option possesses. 
C. INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE 
The internal perspective seeks to create value for customers by aligning activities 
and processes in such a way that the options it produces meet the four criteria of quality 
found in the customer level.  Our model links measurable activities to this creation of 
value.  Members of the GSN that operate in these activities and conduct these processes 
must consider the end product of options as they conduct operations, access and share 
intelligence, establish relationships and communicate with partners, and manage 
resources.  Consideration of the end product of options can yield better management of 
choices at lower levels. 
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Figure 6 depicts the level of the model that traces and links the activities of the 
internal perspective with quality criteria found in the value proposition.  As explained in 
this section, we conceptualize these links between activities and processes and criteria 
with blue lines.  The thicker this blue line, the greater the impact that the activity or 
process has on the criterion it is connected to.  As shown in our model, the answer to the 
question “At what activities and processes must the network excel?” is “Those activities 
and processes that are directly linked to criterion the network customer demands.”  To 
create value, the activities and process must positively affect these criteria. 
 
Figure 6.  The Internal Perspective 
1. Internal to Who? 
The activities and processes found on the strategy map are internal to a Joint 
Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).  JSOTFs are temporary joint commands 
consisting mostly of special operations forces.  The JSOTF is typically established to 
accomplish a specific mission or to control SOF in a specific theater of operations.  
JSOTFs are comprised of all services and have established relationships with inter-
agency partners.  A JSOTF reports to the GCC via the TSOC but operates in close 
conjunction with the country team from the U.S. Department of State. 
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2. The Objectives and Initiatives of the Internal Perspective 
The objectives found in the internal perspective on our strategy map represent the 
specifics a deployed task force must do well in order to maximize their output of high 
quality options in execution of ADM McRaven’s strategy to “Expand the GSN” (Niven, 
2003).  Each objective is allocated to an initiative.  Initiatives represent specific 
programs, functions, or activities deployed task forces will focus on in order to meet 
performance expectations (Niven, 2003).  On our strategy map, a cluster of rectangles 
represents objectives; an oval represents an initiative.  We will discuss each objective, 
respective initiative, and link to the value proposition in the following sections. 
3. The Operations Management Initiative  
The operations initiative is an essential activity of a deployed task force, 
responsible for daily and future operations.  Commonly referred to as the J3, or just OPS, 
this activity approves coordinates and reports on: enabled plus operations (the partnered-
military option) and partner engagement operations.  This part of a task force is heavily 
connected with all elements of the task force and can generate influence through 
communication and direction.  We recommend that the operations initiative of the 
Internal Perspective strive to achieve the following objectives because they are directly 
related to criteria found in the value proposition. 
Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the potential to create 
animosity due to unmet expectations. 
ADM McRaven (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013) 
a. Coordinating Engagement Objective 
Engagement describes any interaction between any member of a task force 
and influential elements of foreign militaries, socio-political and economic systems, or 
inter-agency partners.  Engagements can be office calls, military training, intelligence 
exchanges, or coordination and execution of operations.  Conducting engagement 
requires resources and approval; both are influenced and controlled by the operations 
initiative. 
44 
An example of engagement is a series of meetings between a task force 
commander and his foreign military counterpart, an officer of similar rank.  At the 
meetings, they discuss the local security situation and capabilities gaps.  The meetings 
build trust and familiarity between the two commanders.  A significant aspect of the 
series of meetings is the periodicity in which they take place.  Are they regular?  Are they 
episodic?  What level of periodicity is required by the partner’s culture and security 
environment?  Combined, the terms coordination and engagement should represent a plan 
of action to expand U.S. influence on, and access to, the mechanisms that represent 
options in an efficient way and with understanding of certain intangible aspects of the 
partnership. 
(1) Link to Likelihood of Success and Responsiveness.  The 
coordinated engagement objective is linked to both the responsiveness and likelihood of 
success criterion through the increased trust and understanding of partners that working 
towards this objective creates.  Trust can improve responsiveness by decreasing the time 
a partner’s chain of command takes to approve a partnered-military option.  The 
decreased time it takes for a partner assault force to approve an operation improves the 
responsiveness of an option.  An improved understanding of a partner’s capabilities and 
limitations is linked to the likelihood of success by increasing the chances the U.S. task 
force will choose the correct partner for a specific operation. 
(2) Link to Diversity.  Uniquely, the coordinated engagement 
objective is linked strongly to the diversity of options in the decision maker’s perspective.  
Engagement coordination should seek to balance the attention spent on existing relevant 
options.  The desired outcome of a successful engagement plan is a posture that provides 
timely access to a diversified set of high quality options designed to counter the most 
dangerous and most likely threats, while capitalizing on the most beneficial opportunities.  
Balance in this process will support diversity in the options presented to decision makers 
by avoiding an over emphasis on a specific type of option or a specific partner.  A 
coordinated engagement process will also align JSOTF activities with U.S. foreign policy 
objectives set by the Department of State (United States Government Accountability 
Office [GAO], 2010). 
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In order to conduct engagement, units in the JSOTF require 
resources and approvals, both managed by the J3 component of a JSOTF.  It is through 
resource allocation and approving concept of operations that the operations department 
can manage the engagement process.  Expanding influence, gaining access, and 
improving options all can be partly achieved through management of resources and 
approvals.  The application of these resources and approvals should be based on the 
anticipated effect on option criteria.  It is important to note that the execution of these 
processes will occur in a contested environment; they must be performed more efficiently 
and effectively than those of our adversaries.  We must excel at these processes to 
maximize the quality and availability of options. 
b. Evaluate Partner’s Objective 
A partner force evaluations (PFE) documents holistic appraisals of a 
partner on a myriad of tangible and intangible aspects such as capacity to contribute-to-
operations, willingness to conduct operations, and socio-political ties.  These documents 
represent the value partners bring to the network.  The evaluation serves as an assessment 
of the usefulness and capacity of this specific addition to the network.  Information 
contained in PFEs is required and maintained by the operations initiative. 
Consider a hypothetical example of a coastal African region where 
political sensitivities preclude the permanent pre-positioning of American fast boat 
assets; in fact, the respective chiefs of mission have requested only a small footprint of 
U.S. SOF advisors in each country with no permanent presence.  If maritime interdiction 
operations are likely, the respective partners should be assessed on their capacity to 
contribute to the partnered option with access to boats.  The partner force evaluation 
would assess each country’s maritime assets based on physical attributes such as speed, 
good working order, crew training, or access to fuel.  Collectively, these measurements 
represent each country’s capacity to contribute to the partnered-military, maritime 
interdiction option. 
(1) Link to Likelihood of Success and Responsiveness.  By the 
increased understanding of partner capabilities that the PFE creates, the evaluated 
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partner’s objective is strongly linked to the likelihood of success and responsiveness of 
options.  PFEs assess partner force skill level, providing insights on the likelihood of an 
option’s success involving this partner.  By providing an assessment of their capacity to 
contribute to operations, understanding a partner’s capability speeds operational planning 
and, thus, the responsiveness of the partnered option. 
Understanding the limitations of a partner can drive security force 
assistance towards improving the speed of a partner’s tactical assets such as boats, 
helicopters, and trucks.  The PFE should provide a basis to make decisions regarding 
performance changes in partnered options as a result of investment of resources and 
effort.  Prior to measuring change, a basis must be established; the partner force 
evaluation is that basis. 
(2) Link to Connectivity.  The evaluated partner’s objective 
can link to the connectivity criterion through an assessment of a partner’s access, 
willingness-to-act, and cultural links.  PFEs encourage the dissemination of vital 
information regarding partners.  This documentation ensures understanding of a partner’s 
socio-political affiliations is transferred to future units supporting task forces that operate 
with the partner. 
Excellence at the process of managing the information contained in 
the evaluations will be as important as conducting accurate assessments.  In order for this 
internal process to successfully influence the option criteria, access to information 
regarding partner capacity, willingness, and socio-political ties should be made readily 
available to units preparing to conduct operations with the partner. 
The information contained in the evaluations will enhance resource 
allocations’ suggestions made by task forces.  The complicated part for an operations 
department is that the evaluations will not be standardized in form, but rather unique to 
AOs, unique to partner forces, and unique to enemy threats.  Access and currency of PF 
evaluations will be vital to creating positive impact to this option’s criteria. 
47 
4. The Intelligence Initiative 
The intelligence initiative is an essential activity of a deployed task force, 
responsible for providing intelligence support.  Commonly referred to as the J2, or just 
INTEL, this activity is responsible for generating, accessing, analyzing, and 
disseminating intelligence for U.S. units and their respective partners.  The intelligence 
initiative is heavily connected to the J3 and command element.  It drives operations that 
are conducted and influences decision-making.  We recommend that the intelligence 
initiative of the internal perspective strive to achieve the following objectives because 
they are directly related to criteria found in the value proposition. 
a. Share Information Objective 
Sharing information transfers data, ideas, concepts, and intelligence to 
elements of foreign militaries, socio-political and economic systems, or inter-agency 
partners to assist their decision-making or improve their effectiveness.  Examples of 
information shared include geo-spatial imagery, open-source Twitter-sentiment analysis, 
or consolidated demographic data.  Any member of a task force can share information. 
The sharing of pertinent information in the GSN involves a process 
relationship of: awareness of available information, technology access, and partnership.  
Often, U.S. personnel supporting the GSN will have better awareness and better 
technology than many partner nations, especially in the developing world.  In order to 
share information effectively, task forces require personnel with the awareness of 
information, the technology to access it, and contact with a partner that can use it. 
(1) Link to Likelihood of Success and Responsiveness.  The 
share information objective is strongly linked to both the likelihood of success and 
responsiveness criteria because this objective improves the accuracy and timeliness of 
information driving partnered and non-attributable operations.  Shared information can 
improve the accuracy of a targeted military assault or improve the likelihood that the 
right segment of a population understands a strategic message delivered by an 
information option.  Mastering information sharing can create elements of trust and 
credibility between those supplying the information and those taking action based on it.  
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In the GSN, U.S. personnel supply information to partners so they can take action.  Trust 
and credibility can influence a partner’s “willingness to act” and, thus, improve the 
responsiveness of a partnered option.  Sharing information that the U.S. has better access 
to, can improve the overall quality of an option. 
Sharing relevant and timely information will improve the overall quality 
of options created by the GSN.  Mastering this process will require education of 
personnel operating within the GSN.  Educating personnel that interact with partners on 
the available types of information and methods of presentation enhances awareness and 
utility.  Procurement of technology that generates or accesses information and links that 
technology with personnel who interact with partners will be important in achieving this 
objective. 
b. Use Reachback Objective 
Reachback’s description: the consumption of information products created 
in a separate physical location for use by a task force unable to create the information 
product.  An example of information accessed through reachback would be in-depth 
analysis conducted by experienced analysts regarding the pattern of the life of a known 
terrorist.  The information product is beyond the scope or capability of the task force, 
however, greatly improves the credibility of the information the task force is sharing with 
its partners. 
Reachback capability focuses on the second part of information sharing:  
Accessing through technology, a person or machine that can generate the information.  
Simply knowing who in the network can provide the available information is not enough.  
Task forces must have the technology to request and receive information products so they 
can share them with partners. 
(1) Link to Likelihood of Success. Effectively using reachback 
is linked to the likelihood of success of options because the objective improves the 
accuracy of information driving partnered and non-attributable operations.  Facilities 
providing the information have a greater capacity to produce more powerful analysis than  
 
49 
small footprint, distributed task force operators.  Accessing and ultimately sharing the 
information through the reachback process can improve the likelihood of success of 
partnered and non-attributable options. 
5. The Communications Initiative 
The communications initiative is an essential function that deployed task forces 
perform: daily communication through both words and actions to partners, enemies, and 
neutral parties.  Involving aspects of strategic messaging and inter-personal relationships, 
this function is responsible for influencing the narrative that defines U.S. forces and their 
partners abroad and for expanding capability and influence through individual 
relationships.  Uniquely, this initiative is not isolated to any department or program of a 
task force, but rather open to all personnel that have interaction with outsiders of the task 
force.  We recommend that the communications initiative of the Internal Perspective 
strive to achieve the following objectives because they are directly related to criteria 
found in the value proposition. 
a. Make Relationships Objective 
Making personal relationships with elements of foreign militaries, socio-
political and economic systems, and inter-agency partners creates the structure of the 
network that transmits and receives messages, shares information, and generates 
influence.  Relationships can be personal, professional, clandestine, or other.  
Relationships represent the links of the network and are vital to its success.  Any member 
of a task force can create and maintain a relationship. 
(1) Link to the Value Proposition.  Relationships are the 
bedrock of networks and provide for the transfer and communication of information 
between the U.S. and its partners.  All criteria have an aspect of relationship to them.  
Assessments of the likelihood of success, responsiveness, connectivity, or human rights 
track record of a partner is unattainable if a relationship with the partner does not allow 
U.S. personnel to meet with and assess the partner’s capability. 
We ascertain that any member of a task force can create, maintain 
or destroy relationships.  The stronger personal relationships are with influential people 
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in a foreign country, the greater the amount of influence can be exercised on the decision-
making cycle of the partner.  Effort must be made in choosing the right partners with 
which to establish relationships.  This enhances the matching of partners to threats they 
are willing to act against and enhances the delivery and acceptance of strategic 
communications at any level.  Both the knowledge of a partner’s connections and the 
development of personal relationships take time, effort, and resources to maintain. 
We suggest that task force members excel at two major aspects of 
personal relationships, establishment and maintenance.  The establishing aspect of 
personal relationships is important, as they must know who the most lucrative partners 
are.  The maintaining aspect is important especially to military members as we have 
cyclical deployments, making re-establishment and handoffs key.  Keeping open lines of 
communications with partners is crucial.  Members should evaluate the importance of 
both foreign and U.S., and apply resources to the establishment and maintenance 
appropriately. 
b. Effectively Message  
The objective to effective messaging is strongly linked to the likelihood of 
success for information options by seeking mechanisms that maximize the amount of 
people it can communicate to with.  Understanding the amount of people a specific 
mechanism can reach increases the likelihood that an information option will succeed at 
effectively messaging. 
An example of an effective message is a radio broadcast that influences a 
decisive narrative in a positive way for the U.S. or a partner.  In this example, a task force 
wishes to deliver a message to the population of a city that has 100,000 people.  The task 
force currently has an information option that uses newsprint as the primary mechanism 
for delivery and estimates the reach of this message to be 10,000 readers.  Demographic 
information for the city says that 90 percent of the population is illiterate, but they have 
radios.  In this example, radio is a more effective means with which to communicate than 
newsprint.  The task force should seek to develop an information option that uses radio as  
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its primary means of delivery.  Consequently, the task force should seek to establish 
relationships with people or groups that have access to local radio in order to advance 
towards the effectively message objective. 
(1) Link to Likelihood of Success.  Messaging effectively is 
linked to likelihood of success of options because the objective increases the amount of 
people that can potentially receive a message.  Just as advertisers pay a premium for 
commercial time during the Super Bowl because of the quantity of people watching, task 
forces should seek mechanisms that can potentially reach the most people.  Seeking 
mechanisms that can deliver the greatest audience reach can improve the likelihood of 
success of information options. 
(2) Link to Connectivity.  Effective messaging is linked to 
connectivity because the effects of messaging can shape a partner’s connectedness with 
their environment.  An effective messaging campaign can bring a partner closer to the 
population by illustrating the ability of the partner to provide effective security.  If 
closeness is achieved, this can serve to isolate an enemy from the population, serving 
U.S. interests.  Using messaging campaigns to improve a partner’s image with their 
population increases the understanding of the partner’s connectedness. 
Effective messaging can have significant impacts on the option 
criteria.  Effects of messaging can be improved by leveraging the reach associated with 
mechanisms that deliver messages.  We recommend that task forces seek mechanisms 
with the greatest reach in order to maximize the effect of their messaging. 
6. The Security Force Assistance Initiative 
The Security Force Assistance (SFA) initiative is an important program where 
deployed task forces have an instrumental role in suggesting and sometimes providing 
material support to partners.  Several elements of the task for       ce have an impact on 
SFA to include the J3, command element, and operational units.  We identify that the 
objectives of the security force assistance program should be to enhance the capability of 
partners and to increase the influence of the U.S. in support of the option criteria found in 
the value proposition.      
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a. Enhance Partner’s Objective 
Enhancing partners refers to activities that improve a partner’s ability to 
conduct successful operations.  Activities can be combined training or equipment 
purchases.  An example of improving a partner’s capacity for operations is the use of 
funds authorized by section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act to purchase 
a mobility asset such as trucks.  Before 1206 was used, a partner assault team traveled to 
a target in a slow, old, unreliable transport truck that travels 10 miles per hour, carries 
only 10 assaulters, and breaks down four times out of 10.  The U.S. uses 1206 funds to 
purchase 14 brand-new four-wheel drive pickup trucks.  The new trucks travel 45 miles 
per hour, carry 56 assaulters, and have predictable reliability.  The new trucks represent 
an enhancement of the partner’s capability to conduct operations. 
(1) Link to Likelihood of Success, Responsiveness, and Vetted.  
The enhance partner’s objective is strongly linked to both the likelihood of success and 
responsiveness criterion.  This is because achieving this objective can improve the skill 
level of a partner unit or the ability for the partner to contribute to operations with 
physical assets such as boats, trucks, and helicopters.  Enhancement of partners is 
difficult if Congress does not approve of partnership with an un-vetted unit.  Improved 
skill level and better assets can lead to a higher likelihood of success and responsiveness 
for partnered and non-attributable options. 
Excellence in the internal process can be logically linked to each 
option criteria.  Excellence in partner force evaluations and resource access promotes 
effective planning for the application of available resources to improve an option’s 
quality and responsiveness through training and equipment acquisitions.  A coordinated 
engagement process can improve personal relationships that, in turn, promote trust 
enhancing a partner’s willingness to act.  Sharing accurate, relevant and timely 
information promotes trust and improves the likelihood a partner will experience success 
when taking action.  Reachback capability improves the quality and responsiveness as 
greater access to deeper intelligence analysis links time sensitive intelligence to the forces 
that can take action. 
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Collectively, the activities and processes should represent the focus 
of day-to-day operations for deployed task forces.  Excellence at these processes will 
maximize the capacity of the JSOTFs to produce options that create value for the 
customer level.  The relation to the option criteria shows how everyday activities can 
have an impact on the overall output of an organization. 
D. LEARNING AND GROWTH PERSPECTIVE 
The learning and growth perspective seeks to prepare the enterprise for 
deployment to task forces supporting the GSN by aligning their training with activities 
that are conducted on deployment.  These activities directly affect the four criteria of 
quality found in the customer level.  Our model links training with initiatives and 
objectives in the internal perspective.  Personnel preparing to operate in these initiatives 
and towards these objectives must consider the end product of options as they conduct 
operations, access and share intelligence, establish relationships and communicate with 
partners, and manage resources.  Consideration of the end product of options can yield 
better management of choices at lower levels. 
Figure 7, The Learning and Growth Perspective, depicts the level of the model 
that trains personnel preparing to deploy to task forces.  Also in this level, formal 
partnerships are established through diplomatic channels.  As explained in this section, 
we conceptualize the links between training, formal partnerships, and the initiatives and 
objectives of the internal perspective.  As shown in our model, the answer to the question 
“What should be done before deployment?” is “Training and formal partnerships that best 
support the initiatives and objectives in the internal perspective.”  To create value, the 










1. Who is in this Row? 
The learning and growth perspective considers units before they fall under the 
operational control of GCCs and become part of JSOTFs.  The unit commanders have a 
primary mission focus to man, train, and equip these forces in preparation for 
deployment.  These unit commanders have much say in how a unit organizes, what assets 
a unit acquires, and what types of training activities are done prior to deployment.  The 
primary input of training translates into skills used on deployment.  Focusing training on 
skills that support the creation of options will posture forces deploying to JSOTFs well. 
a. Human Capital 
Human capital is described as the organizational value created by the 
capabilities, skills, and relationships of the employees (Niven, 2003).  In SOF, it 
represents the partnerships, the experience, and knowledge of permanent and temporary 
members of the enterprise as they relate to the objectives found in the Internal 
Perspective. 
b. Training 
Training focused on resource access, intelligence, and communication will 
provide the most return in options.  Resource access training should focus on the 
knowledge of existing resource systems and how these resources can improve a partner’s 
option criteria.  Intelligence training should focus on friendly intelligence capabilities and 
the authorities that govern sharing the products of friendly intelligence units with 
partners.  Communication training should focus on interpersonal communication soft 
skills such as networking, negotiations, and language proficiency. 
c. Formal Partnerships 
Formal partnership at USSOCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida takes 
shape in the form of liaison officers from foreign countries participating in training, 
information sharing, and coordination.  Formal partnerships fostered through collective 
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security agreements provide a framework of relationships from which to create options.  
This resource can be used as a stepping-stone to create options. 
d. Infrastructure 
Task forces require an asset-based global infrastructure to conduct 
operations.  Assets include communication networks that connect the small footprint, 
distributed operations that SOF conducts.  Assets include intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance aircraft and the operators who run the systems.  Physical structures and 
real estate billet task forces, and providing secure training environments are also part of 
this asset-based global infrastructure.  These assets are acquired through appropriations 
authorized by the U.S. Congress, a key decision maker found on the strategy map. 
Activities conducted prior to deployment can prepare personnel to excel at 
the initiatives and objectives of the internal perspective.  Excellence at these initiatives 
and objectives will create options that meet criteria found in the value proposition.  
Customers will recognize the value in these options and recommend these options and 
courses of action to decision makers.  In turn, decision makers happy with diverse sets of 
options presented to them by SOF will continue to fund training, infrastructure, and 
formal partnership programs requested by USSOCOM.  The cycle continues, increasing 




V. BALANCED SCORECARD 
Using the framework from the strategy map in the previous chapter, this chapter 
will describe the BSC in the context of achieving the GSN’s strategic objective. The BSC 
illustrated in Figure 8 resembles the traditional Scorecard except it is working towards 
options created rather than financial outcomes that typically are the goal of corporate 
scorecards. The BSC provides the ability to measure performance by establishing 
objectives and measures that are weighted based on the importance of the GSN’s specific 
area requirements. The weights are heavier at the lower levels because the objectives of 
the internal and learning and growth perspective are directly influenced by SOF 
personnel activities. The decision maker and customer level are weighted less but still 
require all activities to consider the impact at every level. 
 Each region that is established by USSOCOM, “the TSOCs,” can tailor the BSC 
to align the BSC with the GCCs specific strategy.  The scorecard establishes specific 
AOR objectives that link performance to strategy, and then uses measures to gauge 
performance.  Additionally, the scorecard ensures a proper feedback loop is in place to 
help leadership assess and reassess progress.   
The BSC for this project has four operational perspectives (decision maker, 
customer, internal, and learning and growth) that are assessed with specific objectives 
and measures to support the strategy map. Each measurement is given a weight based on 
strategic importance, then aggregated to create a cumulative score of 100 percent. 
Analyzing each measurement, the score can be broken down to identify strengths and 
weaknesses of a team. In Figure 8, the weight assigned percentage may be adjusted based 
on the GCC’s guidance. A breakdown of the BSC from each perspective will be 
















1. Existence of: (more is a better 
score)
National Security 
Council, Chief of 
Mission
A. Unilateral Information Option D. Unilateral 
Military Option
B.Partnered Information Option E.Partnered Military 
Option
1-6 3 6 50% 2.0% 1.0%
C. Non-attrib Information Option F. Non-attrib 
Military Option
Connectivity 1.Partner Importance 1-100 90 85 106% 3.0% 3.2%
Customer 
Perspective




Responsiveness 3. Time between decision to 
employ option and the result of 
  
Time 2 2.5 80% 3.0% 2.4%
Vetted 4. vetted units (Leahy Law) Yes/No 0 1 0% 3.0% 0.0%
Operations 
Management
Evaluate Partners 1. Availability to functional units % 78 80 98% 6.0% 5.9%
2. % of partners evaluated % 95 90 106% 6.0% 6.3%
Internal Perspective 3. Evaluation currency 0 - 6 months = 3                                               
7-12 montths = 2                                       
12+  months = 1
Time 1 1 100% 6.0% 6.0%
Coordinate Engagement 4. Time between engagements 0 - 90 Days = 3                                                   
91-180 Days = 2                                                   
181 + Days = 1
Time 1 1 100% 6.0% 6.0%
Intelligence Share Information 5.  Information consumed that is 
shared 
% 75 90 83% 6.0% 5.0%
Use Reach back 6. Bandwidth T-3 = 3                                                                         
Ethernet = 2                                                             
T-1 = 1      
Through
put
48 80 60% 6.0% 3.6%
Communication Make Relationships 7.  Interactions - Physical, Voice, 
Data (# of contacts)
# 49 50 98% 6.0% 5.9%
Effectively Message 8. Media Reach - percent of 
l i
# 80 80 100% 6.0% 6.0%
Security Force 
Assessment
Enhance Partners 9. % of request fulfilled % 78 90 87% 6.0% 5.2%
Learning and 
Growth (Man, Train 
& Equip 
Perspective)
Training Knowledge of resource 
systems
1. Functional level knowledge of 
resource authorities (1206, CMO, 
M2M) - subjective
% 95 90 106% 8.0% 8.4%
Knowledge of Intelligence 
capabilities
2. % of force trained on 
intelligence sharing
% 90 90 100% 8.0% 8.0%
Communication Soft 
Skills
3. Language proficiency % 100 95 105% 8.0% 8.4%
4. % of force trained on 
negotiation skills
% 100 95 105% 8.0% 8.4%
Total 100.0% 90%
BSC for the Global SOF Network
Measures
Joint Special 








0 - 1 hour = 3                                                             
1 - 24 hours = 2                                                         
24 +  hours = 1
 
Figure 8.  Sample Balanced Scorecard (NOTE: Numbers in this BSC Are for Example Purposes Only) 
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A. DECISION-MAKER PERSPECTIVE 
The first perspective shown in Exhibit 2 is the decision maker perspective; all 
BSC objectives and performance measures exist to support this objective.  This level 
replaces the financial level of the traditional BSC category used by many private sector 
companies. The decision-maker perspective is viewed from the nation’s civilian 
leadership such as the National Security Council, Congress and CoM. This is the top row 
of the BSC; these individuals have overall decision authority, choosing from the options 
created at the subordinate level. It is at this level that the activities of all subordinate 
levels (when meeting objectives) inherently create a diverse array of options that 
decisions makers choose from to achieve informational and military objectives in the 
nation’s interests.  
a. Diversity 
The diversity created by the multiple choices prevents decision makers from 
being pigeonholed into an option that costs more in diplomatic capital than the target is 
worth or not taking action because no appropriate option exists.  Decision makers use 
their situational knowledge to choose the most appropriate option based on external 
factors such as diplomatic environment or value of the target. Due to the time sensitivity 
of some choices, providing a simple view of the score and choices available allows for 
decisions makers to act quickly. 
(1) Existence.  Existence of more than one option creates 
choice; a critical requirement when seeking policy strategy matches as stated in the 
strategy map chapter.  Therefore, producing more options will result in a better overall 
score as it represents diversity in choices. From the decision maker perspective, the goal 
of option diversity is established through six metrics (unilateral information option, 
partnered information option, non-attributable information option, unilateral military 
option, partnered military option, and non-attributable military option). These metrics 
capture the level of partnership between our allies across the military and information 
spectrum.  
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Ultimately, the BSC will show how many options decision makers can choose 
from during times of crisis or opportunity. We demonstrated earlier that decision makers 
value this choice when seeking optimal policy-strategy matches.   
The percent-of-target column on the BSC, can represent success in creating 
diverse choices based on a target.  Alternatively, they may compare the columns, actual 

















1. Existence of: (more is a better 
score)
National Security 
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Military Option
B.Partnered Information Option E.Partnered Military 
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1-6 3 6 50% 2.0% 1.0%









As an example, consider the hypothetical chance opportunity of 
intelligence providing the exact location of a terrorist training camp in the West African 
country of Mali.  In the neighboring country of Burkina Faso, a special operations task 
force has been actively conducting operations for approximately 12 months prior to this 
time sensitive intelligence event.  The task force, through its daily activities, has created 
three options with which it can capitalize on this type of new information.  The options 
the task force has created are unilateral military strike, partnered military strike or non-
attributable military strike.  Thus, this task force has created three options, or courses of 
action out of a possible six.  All three options are military in nature and the task force is 
currently deficient on an information option.  Pending the decision makers’ preferences 
in this particular situation, they could be either well diversified or un-diversified.  If 
decision makers want a military strike, then this task force appears diversified.  If they 
have preference for an information option, then this task force appears non-diverse.    
The NSC and CoM make difficult policy decisions in the complex global 
environment, choice among options greatly enables these decisions.  Subordinate task 
forces should have a goal of option diversity in mind as they conduct the activities that 
create options.  The BSC provides a snapshot to the decision makers and a target for task 
forces.  Having simple metrics to quickly apply towards the information known at the 
highest level allows for quick, decisive decisions to be made. 
B. CUSTOMER PERSPECTIVE 
The second perspective shown in Figure 10 is the customer perspective; the 
criteria found here represent the objectives for specific options created by task forces.  
The customer perspective drives activity to provide options that meet “criteria” important 
to GCC and TSOC commanders. The customer perspective is the link between deployed 
task forces and the NSC and CoM leadership. The criteria that govern the production of 
options are connectivity, likelihood of success, responsiveness, and vetted. 
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Connectivity 1.Partner Importance 1-100 90 85 106% 3.0% 3.2%
Customer 
Perspective




Responsiveness 3. Time between decision to 
employ option and the result of 
  
Time 2 2.5 80% 3.0% 2.4%
Vetted 4. vetted units (Leahy Law) Yes/No 0 1 0% 3.0% 0.0%
0 - 1 hour = 3                                                             
1 - 24 hours = 2                                                         
24 +  hours = 1
 
Figure 10.  Customer Perspective 
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1. Option Criteria/Value Proposition 
The four option criteria make up the value proposition.  The value proposition 
represents how SOF returns values to decision makers.  The four criteria are connectivity, 
Likelihood of success, responsiveness and vetted.  Each contributes to the decision 
maker’s perception of overall option quality.  Task forces strive to ensure their options 
meet these criteria.   
a. Connectivity 
The connectivity measurement is an assessment measuring the partner’s 
connections to the socio-political environment surrounding an enemy; this assessment 
can serve as a proxy for a partner’s support to U.S. strategic objectives.  This score 
(numeric 1-100) is based on the partner’s sensitivity to a crisis or target, and requires 
input from subject matter experts (SME). There can be both political and religious 
dimensions to determining the connectivity of a partner. 
For example, assume a partner force shares the same religion with the 
enemy; in other words, is highly connected with the enemy. Thus, their support to U.S. 
strategic objectives is questionable. Conversely, operating with a partner force with little 
ties to a target might increase their likelihood to support U.S. strategic objectives.  
Understanding how a partner is connected to a crisis allows an SME to determine how 
connectivity will affect the outcome of a potential operation. When determining a score, 
the SME considers a partner’s relationship to potential enemies.  Higher scores translate 
to greater socio-political ties to an environment surrounding a target.   
b. Likelihood of Success:  
The likelihood of success measurement is an assessment predicting the 
option’s chances against probable enemies.  Scores (a percentage) are determined by 
SME’s and represent the option’s chances for attaining the objective it is designed to 
attain.  There are many facets to this assessment and its weakness is that it represents an 
opinion.     
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As an example, consider the evaluation of two military options.  Assume 
U.S. forces comprise a 10 assaulter, unilateral military option.  The option intends to raid 
an enemy camp with 40 enemy combatants.  This unilateral military option has a low 
score on likely to succeed due to low numbers.  As an alternative option, a partnered 
military option represents 10 U.S. personnel and 60 partner force troops. This option has 
a higher score due to the sheer size of the friendly assault force compared to the enemy.  
The SME provides an opinion as to the likelihood of success of these two options against 
probable enemies. If creating and maintaining the unilateral option is an imperative, the 
deployed task force should seek to increase the number of assaulters it can quickly 
assemble into a unilateral option.  This can be achieved by increasing training of 
available U.S. assaulters, requesting more assaulters, or improving the means with which 
assaulters from another task force linkup to create a larger force.   
c. Responsiveness  
Responsiveness measurement is the time between making the decision to 
execute an option and executing it.  Using a scale of one through three, scores response 
times are as follows:   
• Score 3 = 0-1 hour 
• Score 2 = 1–24 hours 
• Score 1 = 24 + hours 
The score for this measurement will be aggregated into the overall score.  
A default of 2 is set for a target score. However, depending on the time sensitivity of a 
crisis the score may move up or down.   
For example, assume a decision maker approves an (M,U) drone strike on 
a specific target. The elapsed time from making a decision to destroying the target in 15 
minutes renders a score of three. Conversely, assume the decision has been made to 
inform a local village through (I,P) media that a terrorist cell has kidnapped coalition 
forces. Rescuing the prisoners must be approved through the partner force that has three 
levels of approval authority.  One day is required for each level of authority. This option  
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would render a score of one (1), putting the hostages at risk. When a scorecard metric is 
low in one category, the GCC may apply other initiatives (such as connectivity) to solve 
the problem 
d. Vetted 
Vetted partners measurement is an assessment of determining whether or 
not the U.S. can train, operate, and share information with a specific country.  Chapter IV 
mentioned the Leahy law, which prevents U.S. assistance and involvement with militaries 
associated with human rights violations. This measure is scored (yes = 1 or no = 0) based 
on meeting the criteria of the Leahy law. It is important that the U.S. continue to set the 
example around the world that it will not support any country that commits human rights 
crimes. As an example of how a score could be calculated, assume a country that is 
committing genocide on its own citizens but is very strategically located is asking for 
U.S. support.  This country would assist in conducting operations in information warfare 
against a neighboring country. Even if the U.S. could gain influence in the region by 
deterring a neighboring country, the U.S. is unable to vet and work the country that is 
committing genocide.  
The customer perspective motivates behavior that provides options 
meeting “criteria” important to the GCC and TSOC commander. This perspective 
requires knowledgeable, competent SME’s to ensure accurate information meets the 
strategy and is being reported to the next level. All the information that reaches the 
customer is based on the activities motivated by the internal perspective. 
C. INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE 
You can’t surge trust. 
(United States Special Operations Command, 2013) 
The third perspective shown in Figure 11 is the internal perspective; this 




towards option criteria.  It seeks to answer the question, “At what activities and processes 
must we excel?”  In answering this question, the initiatives and objectives become 
apparent.       
The internal perspective includes the JSOTF and the JTF, organizations ultimately 
responsible for the creation of options. Success is determined by positive performance of 
the activities that support the customer level.  This level has four Initiatives (operations 
management, intelligence, communications, and resource access) and seven objectives 
(partner force evaluations, coordinated engagements, information sharing, reach-back 
capability, delivering strategic communications, ability to enhance partner capability and 
ability to increase influence). The measures are weighted more heavily in this section of 





Evaluate Partners 1. Availability to functional units % 78 80 98% 6.0% 5.9%
2. % of partners evaluated % 95 90 106% 6.0% 6.3%
Internal Perspective 3. Evaluation currency 0 - 6 months = 3                                               
7-12 montths = 2                                       
12+  months = 1
Time 1 1 100% 6.0% 6.0%
Coordinate Engagement 4. Time between engagements 0 - 90 Days = 3                                                   
91-180 Days = 2                                                   
181 + Days = 1
Time 1 1 100% 6.0% 6.0%
Intelligence Share Information 5.  Information consumed that is 
shared 
% 75 90 83% 6.0% 5.0%
Use Reach back 6. Bandwidth T-3 = 3                                                                         
Ethernet = 2                                                             
T-1 = 1      
Through
put
48 80 60% 6.0% 3.6%
Communication Make Relationships 7.  Interactions - Physical, Voice, 
Data (# of contacts)
# 49 50 98% 6.0% 5.9%
Effectively Message 8. Media Reach - percent of 
l i
# 80 80 100% 6.0% 6.0%
Security Force 
Assessment
Enhance Partners 9. % of request fulfilled % 78 90 87% 6.0% 5.2%
Joint Special 





Figure 11.  Internal Perspective  
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1. Initiative: Operations Management  
Operations management has two objectives linked to it, partner force evaluation 
and coordinated engagements. These objectives are designed to determine the operational 
readiness and potential support of vetted partners.   
a. Evaluate Partners 
The objective of partner force evaluations in this chapter is divided into 
three measurement criteria: availability to functional units, percent of partners evaluated, 
and evaluation currency that determine the strength of the relationship.  Partner force 
evaluations are designed to measure the overall value of a relationship between partners. 
They also determine a partner’s capacity and willingness to act to achieve U.S. interests.  
Management of the information contained in PFEs is as important as the accuracy of the 
PFE itself.   
(1) Availability to Functional Units.  The availability to 
functional units directly affects the likelihood of success and drives the ability to deal 
with a crisis through a partnered arrangement, rather than unilaterally. This score (a 
percentage), measures the amount of task force troops that have received training on a 
partner force evaluation system.  The system provides access to the partner force 
evaluations conducted by SMEs.   
(2) Percent of Partners Evaluated.  The percent of partners that 
have been evaluated determines how engaged U.S. forces are within an AO.  Scoring of 
partners for scorecard purposes involves simply counting the number of vetted partners 
within the AO and reviewing documentation to see if they have been evaluated in the last 
year. The periodicity varies depending on the availability and competency of each 
individual partner. As the U.S. continues to develop relationships, the number of vetted 
partners and periodic evaluations will increase.  Conducting a data search how many 
countries has been evaluated is only one facet of analyzing partners.  Identifying the last 
time they were evaluated also plays a role in the likelihood of success.  
(3) Evaluation Currency.  Currency is a critical aspect of 
partner evaluations because task forces require information relevant to the choices they 
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make regarding partnership.  This measurement makes an assumption that the older an 
evaluation is, the less relevant the information contained becomes.  Currency is measured 
on a scale of one to three.      
• Score 3 = 0-6 months 
• Score 2 = 7–12 months 
• Score 1 = 12 + months 
The score for this measurement will be aggregated into the overall 
score.  A default of 2 is set for a target score. Situational dependent and pending 
commander preferences, the target score may be higher or lower.  A situation where the 
target score would be set lower is an established partner who has fairly consistent training 
and access to resources.  USSOF evaluation of this partner can afford to have a longer 
time in between updates.   
b. Coordinate engagements  
Engagement coordination should seek to balance the attention spent on 
existing relevant options because it separates episodic training from an enduring 
relationship. Time between engagements is the measurement used to determine the 
impact of coordinated engagements.   
(1) Time between Engagements.  Time between engagements 
affects the competency and capability of a partner. This measurement assumes shorter 
time between engagements strengthens the overall relationship. Time between 
engagements is measured on a scale of one to three. 
• Score 3 = 0-90 days 
• Score 2 = 91–180 days 
• Score 1 = 181 + days 
The score for this measurement will be aggregated into the overall 
score.  A default of 2 is set for a target score. Similar to evaluation currency, coordinated 
engagements are measured by the elapsed time since the U.S. previously engaged a 
partner. Having a clear understanding of the partners within the AO, an experienced 
leader can assess how often the U.S. must be engaging a partner. By way of example, an 
Afghani army element conducting real world operations will require continuous 
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engagement to support U.S. policies. Meanwhile, a well-trained British SOF unit will not 
require the same attention. It is the responsibility of the JSOTF to determine how each 
partner will be measured and scored based on their experience. Evaluating and engaging 
with our partners is the core of the GSN.  In order for the U.S. to meet its national 
strategy the operational management initiative is imperative.  To ensure operations 
become enduring we must incorporate the intelligence aspect to the internal perspective.   
2. Initiative: Intelligence 
Intelligence is what drives operations.  By accessing, analyzing and disseminating 
intelligence, the U.S. and their properly vetted partners collaborate and increase the 
GSN’s capability. Sharing intelligence requires trust and ethical fortitude between all 
parties with access to information. The intelligence perspective consists of two types of 
intangible objectives (information sharing and reachback capability) that link partners 
together.  
a. Share Information  
This is the dissemination of information, data, concepts, ideas and 
intelligence among partners. Trust and credibility among those supplying and those 
receiving the information is the cornerstone for effective use of intelligence. Information 
sharing includes both U.S. agencies and international partners. This objective is measured 
by how well information is disseminated across the GSN to increase its effectiveness.   
(1) Information Consumed that is Shared.  The scorecard 
measures the proportion of actionable intelligence. The score (a percentage) is 
determined by an SME’s ability to link information gathered to likelihood of success and 
responsiveness. Linking intelligence to these to objectives drives operations and aids 
decision makers. In order to share information, the GSN must be able to reachback to 
resources in the rear (not on the frontlines) to conduct operations. 
b. Use Reachback 
Reachback capability is the ability for deployed units to have access to 
people or data that can generate and provide information in a timely manner. Figure 12 
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shows a field unit requesting information (left arrow).  Depending on the how much 
information is requested, the unit may need to continue to reachback to a robust 
intelligence center in the U.S.  Reachback is measured by the amount of bandwidth 
available to share information between forward deployed units and units supporting the 
deployed units. 
 
Figure 12.  Example of Reachback Process 
c. Bandwidth 
Bandwidth is the rate by which information can be shared between 
partners. This score (a numeric value) is determined using a scale of one through three 
based on speed that information flows through the network.  The values are defined as 
follows: 
• Score 3 = T-3 line (fast) 
• Score 2 = Ethernet (average) 
• Score 1 = T-1 (slow) 
The expected value is 2; however, depending on the importance of 
information that must be shared the score may adjust up or down.  For example, units 
physically working at a headquarters are going to require a T-3 capability in order to have 
the capacity to get timely information to outlying locations. Conversely, an outlying unit 
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that transmits information only to prevent an enemy from using electronic equipment to 
locate its position requires less bandwidth.  Thus, the outlying units in this example 
would produce a lower score. Bandwidth is crucial for deployed units in remote locations 
to have the ability to access a GSN to request. However, personally communicating with 
partners is the best and simplest way to gather intelligence.  
3. Initiative: Communications 
Physical interactions among partners, perspective partners, and belligerents (along 
with messages delivered through the media) all impact the likelihood of success and 
connectivity. Communication creates an enduring GSN that supports the defense strategy 
to create a global force. Communications consists of two scorecard objectives, personal 
relationships and strategic communications.  
Creating relationships and strategically communicating through the media is 
related to the aspects of the internal perspective that SOF units use to build and develop 
the GSN. As partners are won over through effective interaction, the U.S. can increase its 
support by capitalizing on SFA initiatives to better equip our partners for success.  
a. Make Relationships 
The objective of personal relationships directly links to the overall value 
of the GSN. Creating personal relationships coupled with effective communication 
through media increases the overall U.S. support within an AO. The scorecard measures 
the success of establishing relationships.  
(1) Interactions—Physical, Voice, and Data.  Interactions that 
include physical, voice and data are measured based on the actual number of contacts 
made. This is scored (numeric 1–100) based on the quality of the personal contacts and 
the impact of the actual interaction.  Contact alone does not determine success.  A strong 
relationship with less contact warrants a higher score than a weak relationship with 
multiple contacts. This is a subjective score based on individual perceptions; the type of 
interaction should be factored into the score. The ability to influence a populous through       
strategic media communication (television, radio, internet, and newspapers) supports the 
personal relationships that have been fostered. 
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b. Effectively Message 
Delivery of strategic communications to affect the local populous by a 
unified partner message is designed to sway locals away from the enemy. Strategic 
communications is measured by analyzing the influence the U.S., or partner, has on the 
local population. 
(1) Media Reach.  Media reach is designed to create effective 
messaging that influences different media sources to impact a village, town, city or 
country in line with achieving our strategy. This is also scored (numerical 1–100) by an 
SME who uses the atmospherics of an area to determine the influence a partner or the 
U.S. has in that area. The simplest example of the impact of media is when a liberated 
country is waving American flags.  Such images create a positive message, thereby 
deterring the enemy. 
4. Initiative: Security Force Assistance 
Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is 
not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower 
our partners to defend and govern their own countries.  
Hon. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, 10OCT2007 (Livingston, 2011) 
USSOCOM is the joint proponent for SFA within the Defense Department 
(Livingston, 2011). Security Force Assistance is the direct material and personnel support 
to foreign militaries to improve their capability for providing security.  This has a direct 
connection with the operations management initiative in regards to evaluating a partner 
and providing them capability. Providing these types of resources strongly affects the 
likelihood of success and responsiveness. To measure how effective U.S. applies SFA is 
achieved by analyzing the percentage of SFA requests such as 1206 that are fulfilled. 
a. Enhance Partners 
The U.S. can enhance partner capability ranging from providing SFA in 
USSOF personnel or procuring equipment that increases a partner’s stand-alone 
capability. SFA can be accomplished by providing boats, vehicles, radios, and a myriad 
of other resources using funds such as 1206 made available through congress. 
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(1) Percent of SFA Requests Filled.  The percent of SFA 
requests fulfilled gauges how well operational units are supporting partners and 
expressing the requirement to the CJSOTFC or JTFC. This metric is scored (as a 
percentage) by the number of SFA requests that have been completely fulfilled.  Consider 
an example of how a request could not be filled.  Assume an outgoing unit relinquishes 
responsibility of a partner to an incoming unit and thereby its pending SFA requests. 
Communicating the pending requests is imperative to maintaining relationships and 
maximizing the effectiveness of SFA resources. The GSN’s goal is to replace episodic 
relationships with enduring ones. Proper education on how to use SFA funds such as 
1206 increases the likelihood of success of the GSN.  
The internal perspective is the level in which the GSN will succeed 
or fail! The activities conducted at this level shape how the customer will present the 
options to the decision maker. By measuring the objectives at this level it can be 
determined how effective partnerships are utilized, how well information is collaborated, 
and whether resources are being allocated properly. It is through these measurements that 
the GSN will transition partner relationships from episodic to enduring. As discussed in 
this perspective, the success of internal activities rely heavily on an SME’s ability assess 
partners, situations, and intangible progress. Gaining the required knowledge and 
experience requires applicable learning and growth to occur.  
D. LEARNING AND GROWTH 
Learning and growth is designed to mentally and physically prepare units through 
manning, training, and equipping units prior to deploying overseas. The commanding 
officer (CO) has tremendous influence over the troops under his or her command. Strong 
leadership promoting the SOF ethos will develop into enhanced productivity, dedication, 
professionalism, and commitment. It is responsibility of the CO to instill an 
organizational culture of respect and trust. The learning and growth perspective of the 
BSC is specifically structured to capture this aspect and convey it throughout the entire 
unit down to the most junior person. Leveraging experience, developmental goals, and 
advanced qualifications increases responsibility, which in turn increases the overall 
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capability. Both individual and command wide objectives described in this section are 
critical for applying skills in the internal perspective. The objectives in learning and 
growth are: Knowledge of resource systems, knowledge of intelligence capabilities, and 
communication soft skills. Prior to deploying the focus of the unit commanders is to man, 
train, equip, and assess readiness. Unit commanders focus on preparing for the activities 
that occur in the internal perspective. Resource access training facilitates the ability to be 






Growth (Man, Train 
& Equip 
Perspective)
Training Knowledge of resource 
systems
1. Functional level knowledge of 
resource authorities (1206, CMO, 
M2M) - subjective
% 95 90 106% 8.0% 8.4%
Knowledge of Intelligence 
capabilities
2. % of force trained on 
intelligence sharing
% 90 90 100% 8.0% 8.0%
Communication Soft 
Skills
3. Language proficiency % 100 95 105% 8.0% 8.4%
4. % of force trained on 
negotiation skills









1. Initiative: Training  
The unit commander’s focus is to man, train, equip, forces on resource access, 
intelligence and communication. Training is broken down into three initiatives 
(knowledge of resource systems, knowledge of intelligence capabilities, and 
communication soft skills) that are assessed prior to members deploying overseas.   
a. Knowledge of resource systems 
A key aspect of success at the internal level is the knowledge of the 
resources at the disposal of the SOF units and how to access them. This measure is scored 
(percent of force) by assessing the level of competency of all members’ trained prior to 
deploying.  The purpose of the metric is to ensure training of USSOF personnel to have a 
functional level knowledge of resources available and the authorities on how to 
implement them to increase their capability while forward deployed. A critical resource 
for SOF is the 1206 authority, which is designed for security force assistance to foreign 
partners.  
This statute provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and 
equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime security forces for two 
specified purposes:  
To enable foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security 
forces, to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations. (Nearly all Section 
1206 assistance from FY2006 to FY2009 was for CT training and 
equipment.) 
To enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military 
and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. 
(Serafino, 2013) 
(1) Functional Level Knowledge of Resource Authorities.  
Receiving training in SFA is the first step in preparing SOF members for dealing with 
partner development. A coherent understanding of military to military (M2M) and civil 
military operations (CMO) informs SOF (specifically junior) personnel on how best to 
interact with both U.S. and foreign military units. The environment of unilateral 
operations is declining and understanding how working with other military can increase  
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efficiency, capability and success of operations. Along with having a clear understanding 
of functional knowledge, learning how intelligence capabilities enhance a unit is 
important. 
b. Knowledge of Intelligence Capabilities 
The knowledge of intelligence capabilities objective is a critical part of 
training because maximizing resources available enhances everyone, not just individual 
units. Having a clear understanding of the guidance on how information is disseminated 
among partners is essential for linking information to operations because intelligence 
drives operations. 
(1) Percent of Force Trained on Intelligence Sharing.  The 
scorecard measurement (a percentage) is captured by determining the actual amount of 
SOF personnel that have received training on intelligence collection and sharing 
authorities. Proper training will prevent illicit sharing with partners that are not 
authorized to see certain intelligence, as well as instruct how to share intelligence with 
authorized partners. The simplest way to share information is through personal 
interaction, and the best way to do so is to speak the partner’s language. 
c. Communication Soft Skills 
The objective of communication soft skills is to get SOF personnel trained 
in cultural and language skillsets. The scorecard captures information in two ways: 
Language proficiency and percent of force that has participated in negotiation training. 
(1) Language Proficiency.  Language proficiency is a training 
requirement that instructs SOF personnel in different languages. Each SOF element is 
required to have a specific number of personnel trained in language. However, this 
number may vary between SOF units. Once a member has been trained it is important to 
keep them trained. The scorecard metric (a percentage) adds the total amount initially 
trained and those that have maintained proficiency in a required language and divides it 
against the total number required to be trained. Along with speaking a language, 
understanding the cultures of different partners is also important. 
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(2) Percent of Force Trained on Negotiation Skills.  Receiving 
training in cultural awareness and different types of negotiation skills also prepares SOF 
personnel to deal with activities that will take place in the internal process. Just like 
language training, the scorecard metric (a percent) adds the total number of individuals 
trained and divides it by the total number that must be trained. Combining all the 
objectives of learning and growth with good leadership will properly equip SOF 
personnel with the tools to have a positive impact on the GSN. 
The BSC applies a great deal of emphasis in learning and growth 
because of the importance to setting all personnel up for success. Creating a solid 
foundation helps align the activities with strategy and begins to develop SME’s which are 
critical in the internal perspective.  Being able to link functional knowledge, intelligence 
capabilities and soft communication skills forms a well-rounded SOF operator. 
E. SUMMARY  
The BSC illustrates a method to measure the effectiveness of the GSN by linking 
the strategy map to activities that develop options as well as increase the diversity of 
options provided to decision makers. The BSC, a proven tool implemented in multiple 
Fortune 1000 companies, effectively measures activities and promoted behavior to 
achieve financial goals. Converting the financial perspective into a decision maker 
perspective designed to create options is the key difference between the two BSCs. In 
both environments, the BSC changes as the environment changes.  The objectives, 
measures and weights change accordingly to create the greatest choices possible for the 
decision makers. Having an adjustable tool for a dynamic environment lends the 




A. MAJOR FINDINGS   
We present the following major findings of this project as they relate to the 
questions posed in our research objective section. 
1. How to Measure Value Provided by the GSN? 
a. Options as a Measure of Return 
A major finding of this project is the idea that the value of the GSN should 
be measured in the quality and diversity of options created by the network to deal with 
crisis and opportunity created by the actions of terrorist networks.  In our model, options 
are either military or informational mechanisms that can counter the negative effects of 
terrorist activity.  Use of these mechanisms will result in a net positive benefit for the 
United States. These options involve a range of partnership from unilateral to non-
attributable and this creates diversity.  Authority to employ these mechanisms is 
transferred from civilian decision makers such as the National Security Council through 
geographic combatant commands and chiefs of mission to deployed task forces pursing 
counterterrorism strategies.  The options created by deployed units should reflect the 
preferences of these decision makers. 
2. What Metrics are Appropriate to Measure or Gauge the Effectiveness of 
a SOF Network? 
a. Focus on Operations, Intelligence, Communications and 
Security Force Assistance 
We argue that deployed task forces should employ a product-leadership 
style strategy seeking production of the highest quality options possible, while 
maintaining access to diversity among these options.  Identifying this as a priority, task 
forces can align day-to-day initiatives and activities towards these targets of quality and 
diversity.  By focusing on these aspects, task forces will satisfy primary customers such 
as the geographic combatant commands, theatre special operations commanders, and 
chiefs of mission. 
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This project provides suggestions for quantifying the value of the 
following initiatives of task forces: operations management, intelligence, 
communications, and security force assistance.  In this project, we link these initiatives to 
the criteria defining a customer’s interpretation of quality through objectives that measure 
levels of activity and success.  As suggested by many balanced scorecard experts, task 
forces should develop their own metrics tailored for their specific situations.  In crafting 
the generic metrics for our model, we drew on a collective 32 years of experience 
including deployments to JSOTFs, CJSOTFs, JTFs, and multiple JCETs in various 
theatres.  Deployed task forces should conduct their own assessments using our model as 
a starting point. 
3. How can Lower Tier USSOCOM Unit’s Activities Assess 
Performance? 
a. BSC as a Tool that Links Strategy to Day-to-day Operations 
Lower tier units within USSOCOM can use this BSC tool to link their 
everyday actions to the enterprise strategy of Expand the Global SOF Network by 
aligning their activities toward the output of high quality and diverse options.  If task 
forces measure their value in options-created as suggested by this model, units preparing 
for deployment can more accurately assess and plan their activities while on deployment.  
The measurement of options will serve as a basis, providing a snapshot of the state-of-a-
network before deployment.  Armed with this snapshot, lower units can plan how they 
will attempt to improve the network’s position during their time deployed to the task 
force that manages the network.  We envision use of this model by units to assess the 
health of the options they have created or maintained access to in their respective areas of 
operations. 
Collectively, these concepts and tools represent a way of thinking about 
the purpose of a Global SOF Network and the role of lower tier units in contributing to 
the value of the network.  These concepts and tools can also serve as a template from 
which to build geographic or domain-specific network scorecards. 
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B. LIMITATIONS 
1. Our Own Model 
This project is limited by the fact that the model is our own construct based on a 
modification of established academic theory.  While there is a historical track record of 
balanced scorecards applied in both the private and public sectors, our application is 
certainly unique and new.  Our research has been applied to develop concepts and tools to 
increase the ability of the GSN to create options.  The methodology we used consisted of 
brainstorming with SOF peers and NPS faculty with expertise in strategy and the BSC. 
2. No Data 
Because the GSN is currently conducting its initial implementation, no data or 
tests have yet been conducted to determine the value it provides.  This project created a 
strategy map and BSC to establish objectives with measurements that can be assessed, 
but does not use real world data to test outcomes resulting from their use.  Thus, these 
tools should be considered preliminary and should be used with oversight until measures 
are tested and refined. 
3. Limited Scope 
The scope of our project specifically focused only on the military and information 
instruments of national power and disregarded the diplomatic and economic aspects.  We 
started with the simple DIME acronym for instruments of national power, but had to 
simplify this further to keep the scope achievable.  Simplification of SOFs 11 core 
activities does not represent the uniqueness of each mission set.  Much more complicated 
constructs to describe the instruments of national power exist; the scope was kept narrow 
to allow for more emphasis on the military and information approach.  Task forces 
wishing to implement this model should identify the most applicable instruments of 
national power for their peculiar situation. 
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Option Criteria 
The SOF community is known for its innovation and creativity.  A thorough 
canvassing of operators and support personnel would yield metrics and measurements 
unthinkable to us in our research.  If properly framed with background on the BSC, this 
could be accomplished through e-mail surveys. 
a. Refinement, Validation, and Expansion through Interviews 
Specifically, future research should focus on the option criteria that make 
up the value proposition.  This research could be conducted through interviews of key 
decision makers and commands of the customer level.  Ideally this focus would retain the 
simplicity that we established, but validate the importance of each criterion as perceived 
by the interviewees. 
Interviews with SOF commanders should be conducted to scrutinize the 
objectives and measures developed with our project.  These interviews would suggest 
possible adjustments based on current conditions.  Upon completion of interviews, we 
recommend implementing the BSC into one AO to conduct a proof of concept test and 
begin collecting data to be analyzed.  Other areas of future research should also consider 
all available instruments of national power—not just the military and information aspects 
covered within this research. 
In order for Expand the Global SOF Network to work, USSOCOM will 
need to garner the support of senior enlisted across SOF.  Many of the initiatives and 
objectives we identified during this project are tied to successful buy in from Non-
commissioned officers.  Some type of survey or interview research identifying how the 
enlisted community perceives the strategy shift would be helpful in refinement of the 




Our recommendations are in two parts.  First, we recommend the SOF community 
measure the value of a partnership network through the diversity and quality of the policy 
options that it creates or with which it maintains access.  Second, we recommend units 
forward deployed to task forces to implement Balanced Scorecards to align their 
initiatives and activities with the enterprise strategy of Expand the Global SOF Network. 
We recommend implementing the strategy map and BSC in a proof-of-concept 
test within one AO.  The test should validate criteria, objectives, and initiatives we 
included in our model.  The implementation will allow for data to be collected and 
analyzed. It will also determine if the BSC is successful in creating options.  Continuous 
refinement should occur to improve the BSC as well as keep it concurrent with the 
changing environment. 
Deployed task forces can tailor this BSC to their own preferences.  Where we 
suggested the use of four criteria to measure quality in our value proposition, another user 
could include more or less meeting the needs of commanders in their customer level.  We 
would caution discarding the requirement for diversity.  This is because having only one 
type of option might result in predictability of action. 
E. CONTRIBUTIONS 
This project has identified the value that a partnership network can contribute to 
counterterrorism operations in complex environments. It should be measured in the 
options that it creates to deal with opportunities and crises.  We also analyzed how 
deployed task forces can align their initiatives and activities to maximize their output of 
options.  Similar to the requirement for the enterprise to take ownership of the strategy 
for it to be a success, for our BSC model to succeed, the enterprise will also need to take 
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1. Existence of: (more is a better 
score)
National Security 
Council, Chief of 
Mission
A. Unilateral Information Option D. Unilateral 
Military Option
B.Partnered Information Option E.Partnered Military 
Option
1-6 3 6 50% 2.0% 1.0%
C. Non-attrib Information Option F. Non-attrib 
Military Option
Connectivity 1.Partner Importance 1-100 90 85 106% 3.0% 3.2%
Customer 
Perspective




Responsiveness 3. Time between decision to 
employ option and the result of 
  
Time 2 2.5 80% 3.0% 2.4%
Vetted 4. vetted units (Leahy Law) Yes/No 0 1 0% 3.0% 0.0%
Operations 
Management
Evaluate Partners 1. Availability to functional units % 78 80 98% 6.0% 5.9%
2. % of partners evaluated % 95 90 106% 6.0% 6.3%
Internal Perspective 3. Evaluation currency 0 - 6 months = 3                                               
7-12 montths = 2                                       
12+  months = 1
Time 1 1 100% 6.0% 6.0%
Coordinate Engagement 4. Time between engagements 0 - 90 Days = 3                                                   
91-180 Days = 2                                                   
181 + Days = 1
Time 1 1 100% 6.0% 6.0%
Intelligence Share Information 5.  Information consumed that is 
shared 
% 75 90 83% 6.0% 5.0%
Use Reach back 6. Bandwidth T-3 = 3                                                                         
Ethernet = 2                                                             
T-1 = 1      
Through
put
48 80 60% 6.0% 3.6%
Communication Make Relationships 7.  Interactions - Physical, Voice, 
Data (# of contacts)
# 49 50 98% 6.0% 5.9%
Effectively Message 8. Media Reach - percent of 
l i
# 80 80 100% 6.0% 6.0%
Security Force 
Assessment
Enhance Partners 9. % of request fulfilled % 78 90 87% 6.0% 5.2%
Learning and 
Growth (Man, Train 
& Equip 
Perspective)
Training Knowledge of resource 
systems
1. Functional level knowledge of 
resource authorities (1206, CMO, 
M2M) - subjective
% 95 90 106% 8.0% 8.4%
Knowledge of Intelligence 
capabilities
2. % of force trained on 
intelligence sharing
% 90 90 100% 8.0% 8.0%
Communication Soft 
Skills
3. Language proficiency % 100 95 105% 8.0% 8.4%
4. % of force trained on 
negotiation skills
% 100 95 105% 8.0% 8.4%
Total 100.0% 90%
BSC for the Global SOF Network
Measures
Joint Special 








0 - 1 hour = 3                                                             
1 - 24 hours = 2                                                         
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